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THE ELIMINATION OF CHILD 
“CUSTODY” LITIGATION: USING 
BUSINESS BRANDING TECHNIQUES TO 
TRANSFORM SOCIAL BEHAVIOR 
 
ELENA B. LANGAN∗ 
 
I. Introduction 
 
Divorce negatively affects children;1 no one claims 
otherwise.2  Child custody litigation as part of a divorce action3 
is even more damaging.4  Those seeking to modify parent 
behavior through amendments to custody statutes designed to 
lessen the acrimony often associated with child custody disputes, 
reduce the number of cases requiring judicial intervention, and 
encourage successful shared parenting post-divorce should 
consider how corporate branding principles can be applied to 
achieve these goals. 
 
∗  Associate Dean for Academic Affairs and Associate Professor, Nova 
Southeastern University, Shepard Broad College of Law. J.D., University of 
Maryland School of Law. Florida Bar Board Certified Emeritus Specialist, 
Marital and Family Law.  I would like to thank my colleagues, Michele 
Struffolino and Megan Chaney for their invaluable suggestions, 
encouragement, and support, and my research assistants, Donna McMillan, 
Brianna Jones, and Tara Mulrey, for their assistance on this project. 
1. Elena B. Langan, “We Can Work it Out”: Using Cooperative Mediation 
– a Blend of Collaborative Law and Traditional Mediation – to Resolve Divorce 
Disputes, 30 REV. LITIG. 245, 252 n.31 (2011). 
2. There is some support, however, that undergoing a divorce is less 
damaging to children than being raised in an environment plagued with high 
levels of marital discord.  See Sol R. Rappaport, Deconstructing the Impact of 
Divorce on Children, 47 FAM. L.Q. 353, 359 (2013). 
3. Although “divorce” will be used throughout the article, the same 
concepts apply to paternity cases where parenting responsibility and the 
apportionment of a child’s time with each parent is contested. 
4. Langan, supra note 1, at 252-53 nn.32-35.  See also Linda D. Elrod, 
Client-Directed Lawyers for Children: It is the “Right” Thing to Do, 27 PACE L. 
REV. 869, 898 (2007). 
1
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“Branding” focuses on altering consumer behavior by 
creating favorable impressions regarding a product, service, or 
company, typically to increase sales.5  An example of the impact 
branding can have is the rebranding of Healthy Choice, which 
enhanced public perception of the quality of the company and its 
products.6  ConAgra’s frozen food entrees were originally known 
as Diet Deluxe, a name that conjured up negative images of 
tasteless, dietary deprivation accompanied by unfulfilled 
cravings.7  The new name, Healthy Choice, and rebranding 
campaign projected a positive image suggesting the product 
offers a fit and healthy alternative as part of an active lifestyle, 
leading to increased longevity.8  This is just one example of a 
successful name change and rebranding campaign in a business 
context.9  The name change itself, without the accompanying 
efforts to alter the public perception about the product, however, 
would not have achieved the goal of increasing the company’s 
share of the frozen food market.10 
Child “custody” litigation could similarly benefit from a 
rebranding.  Several states have eliminated “custody” and 
 
5. James Heaton, The Difference Between Marketing and Branding, 
TRONVIG GROUP, http://www.tronviggroup.com/the-difference-between-
marketing-and-branding (last visited Jan. 4, 2016). 
6. Michael Rader, Can Changing Your Company Name Save It?, 
BRANDROOT (Sept. 29, 2014), https://www.brandroot.com/resources/item/55-
can-changing-your-company-name-save-it. 
7. Id. 
8. Id. 
9. Other examples include:  1) “Philip Morris Companies,” the owner of 
Kraft Foods and Miller Brewing company, in addition to the tobacco company 
bearing its name, became “Altria” in 2001 to distance itself from the negative 
perceptions associated with the tobacco industry; 2) “Quantum Computer 
Services” became the hallmark of online services after its name changed to 
“America Online” in 1991; and 3) “Andersen Consulting” became “Accenture” 
in 2001, after separating from the Arthur Andersen accounting firm, 
successfully avoiding being tainted by the Enron scandal that ruined the 
accounting firm’s brand as a premier financial consulting company a year later 
when it was found guilty of obstruction of justice in 2002.  Kurt Eichenwald, 
Enron’s Many Strands: The Investigation; Andersen Charged with Obstruction 
in Enron Inquiry, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 15, 2002), 
www.nytimes.com/2002/03/15/business/enron-s-many-strands-investigation-
andersen-charged-with-obstruction-enron.html?pagewanted=all; 
Corporations, FAMOUS NAME CHANGES, 
http://www.famousnamechanges.net/html/corporate.htm (last visited Jan. 4, 
2016). 
10. See Heaton, supra note 5. 
2http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol36/iss2/2
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“visitation” from their statutes, replacing them with the more 
neutral terms “parenting plans” and “parenting time.”11  In 
addition to changing the nomenclature, state legislatures have 
shifted the burden of resolving these conflicts to parents, 
requiring them either to develop, adopt, and abide by a 
parenting plan, or submit a proposed plan to the court if unable 
to agree to the plan’s provisions themselves.12  Proponents of 
these legislative changes aim to eliminate the perception that 
there is a “winner” when custody issues are litigated, reducing 
the incentive to compete for the award through judicial 
intervention and eliminating the animosity associated with 
those cases that are litigated.  It is difficult to pronounce these 
endeavors a success.  There is no evidence that the statutory 
revisions have achieved the desired decrease in acrimonious 
litigation between parents; instead, there are indications that 
the opposite has occurred.13 
While the legislative goals are laudable, the lack of a social 
behavior rebranding campaign to create a favorable impression 
among “consumers,” i.e. parents, about the benefits derived 
under the new statutory schemes may hamper efforts to achieve 
the objectives.  In addition, mere changes in nomenclature are 
insufficient to accomplish the legislative purpose.  Even where 
revised terminology has been accompanied by substantive 
changes in custody standards, there has been little change in 
parents’ behavior.14  In order to transform the tenor of custody 
disputes into a cooperative enterprise between parents, 
“custody” must be rebranded so that parents embrace the 
nomenclature changes and adopt behaviors designed to achieve 
the new goals.  Rebranding efforts to achieve enhanced outcomes 
for parents and their children confronted with custody disputes 
in divorce cases should be geared towards modifying perceptions 
of “custody” by altering the underlying mission and value 
proposition15 through: changes in the decision-making process; 
garnering support from internal constituencies16 (lawyers and 
 
11. See discussion infra Section IV.B. 
12. See discussion infra Section IV.B.1. 
13. See infra note 94 and accompanying text. 
14. See, e.g., infra note 178. 
15. See discussion infra Section III.A. 
16. See infra notes 46-47 and accompanying text. 
3
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judges); harnessing continuity of the emotional response 
associated with “custody” awards to educate parents about the 
advantages of the new paradigm;17 striking a balance so that 
innovations in custody standards do not surpass public 
understanding of those changes;18 and consistently using the 
“brand” both in state statutes and throughout the litigation 
process.19 
This article discusses how rebranding principles, already 
being used to alter social behavior in other non-consumer 
contexts,20 could be utilized to accomplish the legislative goal to 
reduce litigation as well as diminish animosity in custody cases.  
Part II of this article discusses the impetus for a transformation 
in the way parents view custody disputes.  Part III discusses 
basic branding principles and how companies establish a brand 
and can successfully change their branding.  Part IV explores 
the evolution of the current custody brand, identifies eight states 
that have eliminated “custody” and, in some cases, “visitation” 
from their vernacular, and discusses, in detail, changes to 
Florida’s custody statutes as part of the rebranding of custody 
litigation.  Part V examines Florida’s experience with statutory 
revisions by considering appellate cases and practitioner 
commentary since the amendments to the state’s custody 
statutes went into effect to identify areas that demonstrate a 
failure at successful rebranding.  Lastly, Part VI analyzes the 
implications for a successful attempt to rebrand “custody” and 
suggests that capitalizing on the psychological and emotional 
responses to rebranding could aid in achieving the universal goal 
to reduce the animosity associated with custody litigation. 
 
II. The Impetus for Changes in “Custody” Litigation 
 
Despite the collective efforts of legislators, judges, lawyers, 
legal scholars, and mental health experts, not to mention 
parents, legal disputes over children following divorce persist.  
While significant levels of stress for both parents and children 
 
17. See discussion infra Section VI.A. 
18. See infra notes 52-56 and accompanying text. 
19. See discussion infra Section VI.C. 
20. See discussion infra Section III.C. 
4http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol36/iss2/2
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can be anticipated throughout the divorce process, recent studies 
suggest that within a few years after the divorce has been 
finalized, most children have adapted to their modified living 
arrangements and exhibit comparable psychological functioning 
to peers whose parents did not divorce.21  The exception, 
however, may be for those children that experience high levels 
of parental conflict during the divorce process with disputes 
continuing in the years that follow.22 
The number of high-conflict divorces is relatively small.  The 
vast majority of divorcing couples exit the marriage with 
relatively little conflict and resolve their disputes without 
judicial intervention.23  Cases that are litigated often involve 
high-conflict custody disputes.24  In addition, the parents 
involved in these cases typically engage in post-decretal 
recidivistic litigation, consuming the majority of judicial 
resources.25  There is no universal agreement on the appropriate 
method for handling high conflict custody disputes.  To date, 
while strides have been made in encouraging settlements 
through alternative dispute mechanisms (made mandatory in 
some jurisdictions),26 custody litigation has not been eradicated, 
and its demise at any point in the future is unlikely.  Experts 
remain undeterred, however, and new initiatives are regularly 
touted as the panacea designed to ameliorate the animosity 
associated with contentious battles. 
One slowly evolving trend is to eliminate words such as 
“custody” and “visitation” from the nomenclature used in 
custody statutes.  The thought is that different terminology may 
 
21. Rappaport, supra note 2, at 359. 
22. Id. at 363. 
23. ELEANOR E. MACCOBY & ROBERT H. MNOOKIN, DIVIDING THE CHILD: 
SOCIAL AND LEGAL DILEMMAS OF CUSTODY 137-38 (1992) (suggesting that 90% 
of divorce cases are settled without a trial). 
24. Christine A. Coates et al., Parenting Coordination for High-Conflict 
Families, 42 FAM. CT. REV. 246, 246-47 (2004).  It is estimated that 8-12% of 
divorce cases involve chronic high-conflict disputes between parents.  Id. 
25. See Robert E. Emery & Kimberly C. Emery, Should Courts or Parents 
Make Child-Rearing Decisions?: Married Parents as a Paradigm for Parents 
Who Live Apart, 43 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 365, 382 n.50 (2008); Gerald W. 
Hardcastle, Joint Custody: A Family Court Judge’s Perspective, 32 FAM. L.Q. 
201, 214 (1998). 
26. PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION: ANALYSIS AND 
RECOMMENDATIONS § 2.10 cmt. a (Am. Law Inst. 2002). 
5
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cause parents to behave differently.  Despite the old adage that 
“a rose by any other name would still smell as sweet as a rose,” 
there is support for the argument that the labels ascribed have 
an impact on perceptions and influence behavior and attitudes.27  
A parental relationship with a child, however, is so fundamental 
that simply rebranding how that relationship is characterized 
through nomenclature changes is unlikely to shift attitudes 
towards custody litigation.  States adopting the changed 
nomenclature have, in many instances, also altered the 
standards and process for making custody determinations.28  
These combined modifications in statutory provisions make the 
concept of “custody” litigation an appropriate “product” for 
application of rebranding efforts to revise parental perceptions 
to achieve the desired results. 
The courts are the only purveyors of divorce and custody 
judgments, making branding interests less about successfully 
competing against rivals for a share of the market.  Instead, the 
goal is to reduce “sales” by encouraging parents to settle their 
disputes, thus decreasing the level of animosity associated with 
custody litigation, and developing a positive perception of co-
parenting roles post-divorce. 
 
III. Basic Branding Principles 
 
Branding and marketing theories are typically the focus of 
business development strategies.  Marketing professionals 
promote the importance of branding when developing the image 
projected to the public.29  When companies strive to enhance 
their or their products’ public image, they often undergo a 
rebranding.  They may change their name, logo, or product 
packaging, but rebranding goes beyond the visual symbols and 
name associated with a business or its products.  The rebranding 
process involves building a new, positive perception about the 
business or its products, often by recasting the core mission and 
values of the company.30 
 
27. See infra note 205 and accompanying text. 
28. See infra note 125 and accompanying text. 
29. See Heaton, supra note 5. 
30. Bill Merrilees & Dale Miller, Principles of Corporate Rebranding, 42 
EUR. J. MARKETING 537, 541 (2008). 
6http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol36/iss2/2
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A. An Overview of Branding Concepts 
 
A company’s brand is the impression that the consumer 
develops about the quality of a product or service offered, as well 
as the reputation and reliability of the company.31  A company’s 
brand has been referred to as the “most valuable piece of real 
estate in the world” because it occupies “a corner of someone’s 
mind.”32  In order to be successful, a brand must promote some 
benefit that the customer will receive.  This is the “brand 
promise,” often referred to as the “[v]alue [p]roposition” that 
“create[s] an emotional connection based on the consumer’s 
perception, feelings, and expectations.”33  Because 75% of 
purchase decisions are emotionally-driven, creating this 
emotional connection is what causes consumers to buy a product 
or service and view the company positively.34 
Branding, then, is the “process of building a positive 
collection of perceptions about [a] business in [the] customers’ 
minds.”35  Once the value proposition the company seeks to offer 
has been satisfactorily defined, the process of branding begins 
with the aid of a marketing plan.36  Consistency in the image 
projected is crucial, as is ensuring the consumer can relate to the 
value proposition and the image being created.37 
Selecting the company name is often a critical step in the 
branding process.  Because the name is one element of a 
company’s brand that consumers use to evaluate the quality of 
the product, “a good brand name can enhance the brand image, 
perception, awareness, attributes, and benefits of the 
 
31. Heaton, supra note 5. 
32. JOHN HEGARTY, HEGARTY ON ADVERTISING: TURNING INTELLIGENCE 
INTO MAGIC 555 (Thames & Hudson eds., Kindle ed. 2011). 
33. JAY GRONLUND, BASICS OF BRANDING: A PRACTICAL GUIDE FOR 
MANAGERS 12 (2013). 
34. Liz Papagni, 7 Fresh Ideas on How to Brand Your Business, BUSINESS 
2 COMMUNITY (Apr. 2, 2014), http://www.business2community.com/branding/7-
fresh-ideas-brand-business-0823233. 
35. What Branding Is, FOR DUMMIES, http://www.dummies.com/how-
to/content/what-branding-is.html (emphasis added). 
36. Heaton, supra note 5. 
37. Papagni, supra note 34. 
7
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product[.]”38  Psychological research suggests that the brand 
name itself can trigger a positive emotional response to the 
brand.39 
Rebranding generally involves many of the same measures 
as the original branding and is designed to create a new image 
in order to enhance the company or product’s appeal to 
consumers or, in some cases, distance the company from a prior 
negative perception.40  Rebranding begins with the recognition 
that modifications to the company or its products are required 
and the identification of what needs to be adjusted.41  The 
emphasis is on the new image, not on the fact that a 
transformation is essential for a company to remain viable or to 
further develop.42  Rebranding may be necessary if the brand 
promise is no longer sustainable or if the business has evolved 
so that the public image of the company must be realigned with 
its new goals.43  If all that is being done is changing the name, 
however, rebranding will generally not be successful.44  Success 
occurs when the name change is combined with a new brand 
promise, i.e. a new value proposition the company offers to the 
consumer.45 
Necessary steps in the rebranding process include 
encouraging support from internal stakeholders, creating 
continuity between the old brand and the new brand so the 
consumer understands the transition, and taking the time 
 
38. Mei-chun Cheung et al., Behavioral and Neural Investigation of Brand 
Names, in PSYCHOLOGY OF BRANDING 111, 112 (W. Douglas Evans ed., 2013). 
39. Id. at 126. 
40. Laurent Muzellec & Mary Lambkin, Corporate Rebranding: 
Destroying, Transferring or Creating Brand Equity?, 40 EUR. J. MARKETING 
803, 805 (2006). 
41. Giselle Abramovich, 5 Strategic Considerations for a Successful 
Rebrand, CMO.COM (Mar. 11, 2014), 
 http://www.cmo.com/articles/2014/3/7/5_strategic_consider.html. 
42. Id. 
43. Id. 
44. Kim Lachance Shandrow, The 8 Must-Follow Rules for Rebranding 
Your Company, ENTREPRENEUR (Sept. 10, 2014), 
http://www.entrepreneur.com/article/237296. 
45. Abramovich, supra note 41.  ePrize underwent a successful rebranding 
when it changed its name to HelloWorld, after expanding its services beyond 
connecting consumers with online sweepstakes, and offered new product lines.  
Id. 
8http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol36/iss2/2
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necessary to accomplish the shift in consumer perceptions.46  
Although branding is externally focused on managing public 
perception, internal constituencies are a vital component in the 
rebranding process.47  Unless employees embrace the new value 
proposition and promote it through their interactions with 
consumers, the consistency of message will be lost.48  Similarly, 
the new branding efforts must remain cognizant of the old brand 
and purposefully strengthen the positive image that is desired.49  
If the goal is to distance the company from negative branding, 
efforts must be focused on demonstrating the departure from the 
prior unsuccessful or outdated branding and how the revised 
brand promise will benefit the consumer.50  If the new branding 
is part of the evolution of the brand as the business grows, the 
consumer must be led to believe that there is further 
improvement or enhancement of an already desirable 
commodity.51  Lastly, the time it takes to shift public perception 
must be considered to ensure consumers understand the new 
brand.52 
One highly publicized “epic” rebranding failure involves 
JCPenney.53  In a third attempt at rebranding in three years to 
boost sagging sales, the retail merchant eliminated its 
traditional sales and discount approach, familiar to consumers, 
and introduced new, lower everyday pricing, calling it “Fair and 
Square Pricing,” and added month-long special deals and “best 
prices” days during the month.54  These efforts drove away the 
company’s loyal customer base, causing sales to drop by almost 
20%.55  The CEO acknowledged that the rebranding was 
confusing for consumers who did not comprehend the new 
 
46. Kristi Knight, 5 Tips on Rebranding from a Billion-Dollar Expert, 
ENTREPRENEUR (Sept. 3, 2014), http://www.entrepreneur.com/article/236942. 
47. Id. 
48. Id.  See also Merrilees & Miller, supra note 30, at 541. 
49. Knight, supra note 46. 
50. See id. 
51. See id. 
52. Id. 
53. Steve Olenski, JC Penney’s Epic Rebranding Fail, FORBES (June 15, 
2012), http://www.forbes.com/sites/marketshare/2012/06/15/jc-penneys-epic-
rebranding-fail/. 
54. Id. 
55. Id. 
9
  
384 PACE LAW REVIEW Vol.  36:2 
nomenclature.56  The rebranding failed because there was a lack 
of continuity between the old brand and the new, causing the 
innovative pricing approach to surpass the customer’s 
understanding of the benefits that may have been associated 
with the changes.57 
 
B. Psychological Aspects of Branding 
 
Because branding creates an emotional response by the 
target audience, the psychology behind the effectiveness of 
branding is a particularly favorite topic for exploration and 
analysis.  In his article Branding and the Psychology of 
Consumer Behavior, Bobby Calder discussed the dual thinking 
process that determines behavior; in one stage, referred to as 
System 1, individuals react reflexively, usually without 
conscious thought when confronted with specific cues, in a 
process called “priming.”58  Calder described one particular 
study that demonstrated the effects of priming: the study used 
word associations, where individuals were given a list of words, 
including ones associated with being elderly, and told to 
organize them into sentences; these individuals subsequently 
walked much slower after completing the task than another 
group that had the identical words, minus those with the elderly 
connotation.59  The individuals’ behavior was “primed” by being 
exposed to the words acting as cues. 
The other stage of thinking, referred to as System 2, 
requires conscious thought and reasoning focused on resolving a 
problem.60  A classic example would be a math problem solved in 
a systematic way.61  This stage of thinking is used to resolve 
conflicts as new information and prior associations are 
processed.62  When this thought process becomes explicit as a 
way of analyzing alternatives, those thoughts or associations 
 
56. Id. 
57. See id. 
58. Bobby J. Calder, Branding and the Psychology of Consumer Behavior, 
in PSYCHOLOGY OF BRANDING 3, 6 (W. Douglas Evans ed., 2013). 
59. Id. 
60. Id. at 7. 
61. Id. 
62. Id. 
10http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol36/iss2/2
  
2016 CHILD “CUSTODY” LITIGATION 385 
become beliefs.63  Calder notes, however, that invoking System 
2 thinking requires the individual to be motivated and involved 
in the process because of the effort required to scrutinize the 
information received.64 
Influencing these two stages of thinking is the goal of 
branding.  By appealing to both the automatic, reflexive 
responses as well as beliefs created through orderly processing 
of information, marketers can create an “attitude,” defined as 
“evaluating something favorably or unfavorably.”65  Successful 
branding strives to persuade the individual through effective 
marketing that the product is favorable, creating a positive 
attitude that eventually leads to habitual, reflexive use of the 
product, even when exposed to other choices.66 
 
C. Using Branding to Influence Social Behavior 
 
Branding principles are just now being viewed as effective 
tools to modify social behavior.  The theory is that behaviors 
have similar characteristics to goods because they provide 
choices to consumers and can be couched in terms of costs (risks) 
and benefits.67 
Although little sponsored research has been conducted, 
rebranding campaigns to modify risky health behavior are 
developing.68  Public health researchers have begun to treat 
healthy behaviors, such as condom usage, smoking cessation, 
and substance abuse avoidance as “products” to be marketed to 
consumers.69  The goal has been to brand such behaviors with 
positive images of a healthy, disease-free lifestyle, while at the 
same time rebranding risky behavior, such as combining alcohol 
and unprotected sex, with a negative image.70  Smoking, 
 
63. Id. 
64. Id. at 9. 
65. Id. at 8. 
66. Id. at 12. 
67. W. Douglas Evans, Branding Social and Health Behavior: An 
Education and Research Agenda, in PSYCHOLOGY OF BRANDING 133, 134 (W. 
Douglas Evans ed., 2013). 
68. Id. at 142. 
69. Id. at 136. 
70. Id. at 139. 
11
  
386 PACE LAW REVIEW Vol.  36:2 
commercially glamorized through marketing images such as the 
rugged Marlboro man, is being rebranded successfully as a 
health risk, while living a tobacco-free lifestyle is touted for its 
health benefits that promote longevity.71 
Branding campaigns targeting at-risk groups have the 
highest likelihood of success if they can create new beliefs and 
attitudes towards prevention and healthy alternatives.72  The 
challenge, however, is in rebranding risky behavior because of 
the positive images that instigate such behavior in the first 
place.73  To be successful, the branding/rebranding campaign 
must cause consumers to adopt a positive attitude towards the 
benefits of a healthy lifestyle and develop a negative view of 
risky behavior.74 
 
IV. The Evolution of the “Custody” Brand 
 
Unlike businesses that strive to differentiate themselves 
from competitors through their brand in order to develop a 
strong customer base, custody litigation does not involve the sale 
of goods or services that can be obtained from a variety of 
sources.  Custody litigation is controlled by state governments 
through legislative action and judicial implementation, and 
judges and legislators are attempting to exit the business of 
resolving custody disputes, not increase their market share.  
Branding concepts, however, have application in the custody 
litigation arena.  The legislature and courts are, in fact, “selling” 
the concept of avoiding litigation and ensuring better outcomes 
for children through the statutory schemes adopted that drive 
parties to make decisions concerning child placement and to do 
so civilly, respectfully, and without animosity.  Now that the goal 
has been established, branding principles can be used to achieve 
that goal. 
Just like healthy social behavior is a product that can be 
rebranded, custody litigation and parental behavior associated 
with it is capable of being effectively rebranded.  Rebranding is 
 
71. Id. at 136. 
72. Id. at 139. 
73. See id. 
74. See id. 
12http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol36/iss2/2
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necessary because the child custody standards continuum has 
progressed from one of clearly defined rules to discretionary 
factors designed to promote the best interests of the child.75  As 
a result of this evolutionary process, the predictability 
associated with custody determinations has devolved into a 
system rife with uncertainty and conflict.76 
 
A. Shifts in Custody Standards 
 
Throughout ancient history and until the early 19th century, 
in the event of divorce, children were generally placed with the 
patriarch of the family.77  More than 200 years ago, the custody 
pendulum began to swing in the opposite direction with the 
introduction of the “tender years” doctrine under English 
common law, which resulted in maternal preference based on 
women’s primary caretaking roles.78  The “tender years” doctrine 
continued as the prevailing standard in the United States until 
no-fault divorce concepts were introduced in the 1970s, 
heralding changes in custody laws as a preference for joint legal 
custody surfaced.79  The “best interest of the child” standard 
 
75. Robert H. Mnookin, Child-Custody Adjudication: Judicial Functions 
in the Face of Indeterminacy, 39 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 226, 233 (1975).  See 
generally Heather Crosby, The Irretrievable Breakdown of the Child: 
Minnesota’s Move Toward Parenting Plans, 21 HAMLINE J. PUB. L. & POL’Y 489, 
492-499 (2000) (discussing the evolution of principles guiding child custody 
decision-making). 
76. Critics of the current best interest of the child maintain that it creates 
uncertainty in custody determinations, leading to more parental disputes.  See 
infra notes 79-85 and accompanying text. 
77. See Ariel Ayanna, From Children’s Interests to Parental 
Responsibility: Degendering Parenthood through Custodial Obligation, 19 
UCLA WOMEN’S L.J. 1, 9-10 (2012). 
78. Richard A. Warshak, Parenting by the Clock: The Best-Interest-of-the-
Child Standard, Judicial Discretion, and the American Law Institute’s 
“Approximation Rule”, 41 U. BALT. L. REV. 83, 90 (2011). 
79. See Ayanna, supra note 77, at 11-12; Jane C. Murphy, Rules, 
Responsibility and Commitment to Children: The New Language of Morality in 
Family Law, 60 U. PITT. L. REV. 1111, 1181 (1999).  “Joint custody” can mean 
“joint legal custody,” where parents share decision-making for major issues 
affecting the child (e.g. religion, schooling, health, etc.); “joint physical 
custody,” where parents share the custodial residence of the child on a fairly 
equal basis; or a combination of both joint legal and physical custody.  Maria 
P. Cognetti & Nadya J. Chmil, Shared Parenting – Have We Really Closed the 
GAP?: A Comment on AFCC’s Think Tank Report, 52 FAM. CT. REV. 181, 184 
13
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began to gain popularity during this time as courts balanced 
factors to determine which parent provided the optimal 
environment in which to raise a child.80 
Although the best interest of the child standard has been 
favored for almost fifty years, its shortcomings and difficulties 
in application have been well-documented.81  Without entirely 
eviscerating the standard, various rebuttable presumptions 
thought to advance the child’s best interest have been proposed 
to ameliorate some of the uncertainty the standard brings.82  
Presumptions have included the primary caretaker preference,83 
the “approximation rule” endorsed by the American Law 
 
(2014).  The distinction is not always made clear in statutes or by legal 
scholars. 
80. Ayanna, supra note 77, at 12-13. 
81. See, e.g., Jon Elster, Solomonic Judgments: Against the Best Interests 
of the Child, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 11-28 (1987) (arguing that the best interest 
of the child standard is indeterminate, especially when judges are confronted 
with equally fit parents; it is unjust because it ignores parental rights; it is 
self-defeating because it encourages litigation, which is contrary to the child’s 
best interest; and it can be sacrificed in favor of promoting a public policy 
consideration); Katherine Hunt Federle, Looking for Rights in the all the 
Wrong Places: Resolving Custody Disputes in Divorce Proceedings, 15 CARDOZO 
L. REV. 1523, 1540-43 (1994) (examining criticism of the best interest 
standard).  The best interest standard is problematic from an adjudicatory 
perspective because it requires an assessment of individuals with a view 
towards predicting future events, unlike typical adversarial litigation that 
focuses on resolving disputes about past events.  Jana B. Singer, Bargaining 
in the Shadow of the Best-Interests Standard: The Close Connection Between 
Substance and Process in Resolving Divorce-Related Parenting Disputes, 77 
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 177, 180 (2014). 
82. Even these attempts to add certainty to the standards fall short.  For 
example, surveys suggest that even if the approximation rule was the operative 
standard, litigants would dispute the amount of time each spent in caring for 
the children.  See Mary Jean Dolan & Daniel J. Hynan, Fighting Over Bedtime 
Stories: An Empirical Study of the Risks of Valuing Quantity over Quality in 
Child Custody Decisions, 38 LAW & PSYCHOL. REV. 45, 62-66 (2013-2014); 
Warshak, supra note 78, at 126.  See Mary Kate Kearney, The New Paradigm 
in Custody Law: Looking at Parents with a Loving Eye, 28 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 543, 
552-63 (1996) (discussing a comprehensive comparison of the advantages and 
disadvantages of the best interest of the child standard, joint custody option, 
and primary caretaker preference). 
83. Federle, supra note 81, at 1547. 
14http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol36/iss2/2
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Institute,84 and joint physical custody.85  These presumptions 
can be overcome, however, by a judicial finding that the 
presumptive arrangement is not in the child’s best interest.86 
With the adoption of the best interest standard there was 
also a declaration that children have rights that are to be 
protected.87  More than twenty-five years ago it was observed 
that some reformers viewed the child’s interests or rights as 
paramount, with the parents’ interests being subservient.88  
Despite early reforms based on evidence that a child fares best 
when both parents are involved in the child’s life, there was little 
effort to impose duties upon a parent, primarily the non-
custodial parent, to assume more of the child-rearing 
responsibilities.89  Even scholars promoting joint custody 
arrangements acknowledge that the lure of substantial 
involvement in decision-making and time-sharing may not 
“incentivize” a disinterested parent to participate in co-
parenting.90  This has started to change with the adoption of 
statutes requiring “parenting plans” to be agreed to by the 
parties, or absent agreement, ordered by the court.  Whether 
 
84. The “approximation rule” provides: 
 
Unless otherwise resolved by agreement of the parents . . . , 
the court should allocate custodial responsibility so that the 
proportion of custodial time the child spends with each 
parent approximates the proportion of time each parent 
spent performing caretaking functions for the child prior to 
the parents' separation or, if the parents never lived together, 
before the filing of the action[.] 
 
PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION: ANALYSIS AND 
RECOMMENDATIONS § 2.08(1) (Am. Law Inst. 2002). 
85. See, e.g., IDAHO CODE ANN. § 32-717 (West 2015); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 
40-4-9.1(A) (West 2015). 
86. See, e.g., IDAHO CODE ANN. § 32-717(1)(a)- (g) (West 2015); N.M. STAT. 
ANN. § 40-4-9.1(A), (B) (West 2015). 
87. See generally Elrod, supra note 4. 
88. Karen Czapanskiy, Volunteers and Drafters: The Struggle for Parental 
Equality, 38 UCLA L. REV. 1415, 1442 (1991).  Additionally, the supremacy of 
children’s rights over their parents has been promoted more recently.  James 
G. Dwyer, Parents’ Self-Determination and Children’s Custody: A New 
Analytical Framework for State Structuring of Children’s Family Life, 54 ARIZ. 
L. REV. 79, 79 (2012). 
89. Czapanskiy, supra note 88, at 1443. 
90. Ayanna, supra note 77, at 48. 
15
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mandating participation in the decision-making process defining 
how the child will be raised will actually result in increased 
participation by both parents post-divorce is debatable.91 
Current legislation mandating shared custodial and 
parental responsibility arrangements is often based on studies 
suggesting that the child and parents benefit when an ongoing 
relationship with both parents, characterized by frequent 
contact and joint parental involvement in child-rearing, is 
maintained.92  Such activities promote the child’s best interest 
traumatic and engaged parents comply with support obligations 
more regularly.93  Theoretically, this because post-divorce 
adjustment is less should also reduce the animosity associated 
with custody disputes by reducing the unpredictability of 
litigation outcomes.94  Opponents to shared parenting note that 
requiring frequent contact between the parents can exacerbate 
litigation rather than decrease it, causing detriment to the 
parents, as well as the child.95 
It has been suggested that parents follow one of three co-
parenting models when required to engage in shared parenting: 
“cooperative,” “parallel,” or “chronically conflicted.”96  Post-
divorce, approximately 25% of parents cooperatively co-parent, 
freely exchanging information about the child and successfully 
 
91. Michael T. Flannery, Is “Bird Nesting” in the Best Interest of 
Children?, 57 SMU L. REV. 295, 348 n.333 (2004). 
92. See Cynthia R. Mabry, Indissoluble Nonresidential Parenthood: 
Making it More than Semantics When Parents Share Parenting 
Responsibilities, 26 BYU J. PUB. L. 229, 236-38 (2012) (discussing advantages 
and disadvantages associated with shared parenting including lack of stability 
resulting from two homes, often with differing rules and expectations). 
93. Id. at 236. 
94. See Elrod, supra note 4, at 900 (suggesting that parents are more 
likely to hire experts and engage in protracted litigation because the stakes 
associated with custody disputes are so high and the outcomes are 
unpredictable). 
95. See Mabry, supra note 92, at 238-41 (discussing the negative impact 
of forced shared parenting in high conflict divorces); Peter Jaffe, A Presumption 
Against Shared Parenting for Family Court Litigants, 52 FAM. CT. REV. 187, 
187-88 (2014) (arguing that shared parenting should not be the presumption 
in high conflict cases, essentially those where the parents litigate issues 
relating to custody, especially when accompanied by a history of domestic 
violence, addictions, or mental health issues). 
96. Matthew Sullivan, Feature, Coparenting: A Lifelong Partnership, 36 
FAM. ADVOC. 18, 19 (2013). 
16http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol36/iss2/2
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negotiating conflicts that arise; another 40% adopt a parallel co-
parenting style, interacting infrequently with little conflict, 
while still adhering to shared parenting concepts as needed; and 
the remaining 35% are chronically conflicted, exhibiting 
“insufficient problem-solving and decision-making skills.”97  
Children parented by the latter group tend to have the most 
difficulty with post-divorce adjustment.98 
 
B. The New Value Proposition in Custody Litigation 
 
The new terminology that has accompanied changes in 
custody standards and the process through which custody 
determinations are made represents an evolving trend to 
eliminate references to “custody” and “visitation.”  The terms 
“parenting plans” and “parenting time” have gained popularity 
among state legislators, suggesting a nationwide trend requiring 
the adoption of “parenting plans”99 and the elimination of 
traditional awards of “custody” and “visitation” to parents in an 
effort to moderate the negative nomenclature thought to 
contribute to the contentiousness of custody litigation.  These 
changes represent a shift in the “value proposition” that, in 
many cases is accompanied by both semantic changes, as well as 
more fundamental changes in custody standards and the process 
of determining custody.  Unlike shifts in value propositions 
made by companies offering products and services, the changes 
in the value proposition offered in custody litigation has not been 
accompanied by intensive rebranding campaigns. 
 
1.  Parenting Plans 
 
The first reference to a “parenting plan” in a divorce statute 
dates back to at least 1987 with the adoption of the Washington 
State Parenting Act requiring parties in a divorce action to 
 
97. Id. 
98. Id. 
99. In 1990, it was suggested that the adoption of a “parenting plan” 
requirement in divorce statutes was a developing trend.  Jane W. Ellis, Plans, 
Protections, and Professional Intervention: Innovations in Divorce Custody 
Reform and the Role of Legal Professionals, 24 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 65, 73 
(1990). 
17
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submit a proposed “parenting plan” to the court.100  The adoption 
of the phrase to identify the terms governing the parent-child 
relationship when parents do not reside together has undergone 
a slow but steady progression.101  During the 1990s, at least nine 
additional states amended statutes to adopt the new 
nomenclature.102  Since 2000, the momentum has increased, so 
that currently at least thirty states and the District of Columbia 
include the term “parenting plan” in statutes or rules relating to 
child placement following divorce.103 
 
100. 1987 Wash. Sess. Laws 2016-29.  Prior to Washington’s use of the 
term, several other states required that parties submit a “plan” that included 
details about the parents’ plans for a child’s care and upbringing, but the 
phrase “parenting plan” was not used as a legal term of art.  For a discussion 
of the generic requirement to develop a custody “plan”.  See Ellis, supra note 
99, at 70. 
101. During the 1989 Annual Meeting, the American Bar Association 
House of Delegates approved a Model Joint Custody Statute that required a 
“parenting plan” when the parents were to have joint custody or shared 
parental responsibility.  The statute did not gain wide acceptance.  Ellis, supra 
note 99, at 70. 
102. Arizona, 1997 Ariz. Sess. Laws 1402-04; California, 1993 Cal. Stat. 
1624; Colorado, 1997 Colo. Sess. Laws 973; Missouri, 1998 Mo. Laws A/4/5 Box 
184 Folder 128; Montana, 1997 Mont. Laws 1567; New Mexico, 1999 N.M. 
Laws 1541; Ohio, 1990 Ohio Laws 112; Oregon, 1997 Or. Laws 1858; 
Tennessee, 1997 Tenn. Pub. Acts 1176. 
103. The following jurisdictions include “parenting plans” in their 
statutes or rules: Arizona, ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-403.02 (2015); California, 
CAL. FAM. CODE § 3040 (West 2015); Colorado, COLO. REV. STAT. § 14-10-124 
(West 2015); Connecticut, CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 25-30 (West 2015); District 
of Columbia, D.C. CODE ANN. § 16-914 (West 2015); Florida, FLA. STAT. § 61.13 
(2015); Georgia, GA. CODE ANN. § 19-9-1 (West 2015); Hawaii, HAW. REV. STAT. 
ANN. § 571-46.5 (West 2015); Idaho, IDAHO CODE ANN. § 32-1402(4) (West 2015); 
Iowa, IOWA CODE ANN. § 598.41 (West 2015); Kansas, KAN. STAT. ANN. § 23-
3211 (West 2014); Maine, ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 19-A, § 1653 (2014); 
Minnesota, MINN. STAT. ANN. § 518.1705 (West 2015); Missouri, MO. ANN.  
STAT. § 452.310 (West 2015); Montana, MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-4-234 (West 
2015); Nebraska, NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 42-364 (West 2015); New Hampshire, 
N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 461-A:1 (West 2015); New Mexico, N.M. STAT. ANN. § 
40-4-9.1 (West 2015); North Carolina, N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN., R. REG. MEDIATION 
OF CHILD CUSTODY AND VISITATION DISP. 1, 12 (WEST 2015); North Dakota, N.D. 
CENT. CODE ANN.  § 14-09-30 (West 2015); Ohio, OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3109.04 
(West 2015); Oklahoma, OKLA. STAT. tit. 43, § 120.3 (West 2015); Oregon, OR. 
REV. STAT. ANN. § 107.102 (West 2015); Pennsylvania, 23 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. 
§ 5331 (West 2015); South Dakota, S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 25-4A App. 
A  Guideline 5 (West 2015); Tennessee, TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-6-402 (West 
2015); Texas, TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 153.603 (West 2015); Utah, UTAH CODE 
ANN. § 30-3-10.8 (West 2015); Washington, WASH. REV. CODE Ann. § 26.09.184 
(West 2015); West Virginia, W. VA. CODE ANN. § 48-9-205 (West 2015); 
18http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol36/iss2/2
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Not all states require the adoption of a parenting plan, 
however.  At least six refer to a parenting plan only in passing 
as a generic term, rather than as a formal plan assigning 
parental rights and responsibility and delineating contact 
between a parent and a child.104  Others require the parties to 
submit a proposed plan in procedural rules, but not do not detail 
what must be included in the proposal.105  Several, however, 
mandate the filing of a parenting plan in each case and 
enumerate those terms that must be included in the plan, such 
as the schedule of parenting time between the parents and the 
child; where the child will attend school; doctors and healthcare 
facilities that will provide medical care for the child; religious 
affiliation; holiday and summer parenting time schedules; the 
method of communication between the parent and the child, 
including electronic communications; child-care arrangements; 
transportation; and methods to be used for resolving disputes 
between the parents, such as mediation or the retention of 
parenting coordinators.106  Others require the filing of a 
parenting plan and offer suggestions of provisions to include, but 
do not require their inclusion.107  Still other states give parents 
and courts the option of developing a general or detailed 
 
Wisconsin; WIS. STAT. ANN. § 767.41 (West 2015). 
104. See, e.g., California, CAL. FAM. CODE § 3040 (West 2015) (stating the 
court has wide discretion in choosing a parenting plan that is in the best 
interest of the child); Connecticut, CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46b-56d (West 
2015) (requiring the court to consider the impact a parent’s relocation would 
have on an “existing parenting plan”); Idaho, IDAHO CODE ANN. § 32-1402(4) 
(West 2015) (discussing the need for parenting plans in high conflict cases to 
help “peacefully resolve child custody and visitation issues,” but does not 
mention the adoption of a plan in IDAHO CODE § 32-717 and 717b dealing with 
custody of children in divorce cases); Maine, ME. STAT. ANN. tit. 19-A, § 1653 
(West 2015) (referring to a parenting plan only in connection with duties 
assigned to a parenting coordinator); Oklahoma, OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 
120.3 (West 2015) (referring to a parenting plan only in connection with duties 
assigned to a parenting coordinator). 
105. See, e.g., Connecticut, CONN. R. SUPER. CT. FAM. § 25-30 (requiring 
parties in divorce cases to submit a detailed proposed order that includes a 
parenting plan). 
106. See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 19-9-1 (West 2015); MO. ANN. STAT. § 
452.310 (West 2015); N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 14-09-30 (West 2015); 23 PA. 
CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5331(West 2015); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 767.41 (West 2015). 
107. See, e.g., MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-4-234 (West 2015); D.C. CODE ANN. 
§ 16-914 (West 2015). 
19
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parenting plan.108 
 
2.  “Custody” and “Visitation” 
 
Over the past twenty years, eight states have completely 
eliminated references to “custody” in statutory text governing 
the parent-child relationship after divorce.  Texas was the first 
to adopt an alternative term in 1995;109 Maine,110 Montana,111 
and Colorado112 followed suit in each of the subsequent three 
years, respectively. After a seven year lull New Hampshire 
extensively revised its statutes in 2005,113 followed by Florida in 
2008,114 North Dakota in 2009,115 and Arizona in 2012.116  In lieu 
of “custody,” most states adopted some version of “parental 
rights and responsibilities.”117  Texas adopted the terms 
“managing conservatorship” and “possessory 
 
108. See, e.g., OR. REV. STAT. ANN § 107.102 (West 2015) (allowing for a 
general parenting plan that lets parents set terms on an informal basis, but 
which sets forth the “minimum amount of parenting time and access a 
noncustodial parent is entitled to have,” or a detailed plan that may include 
provisions relating to: “(a) Residential schedule; (b) Holiday, birthday and 
vacation planning; (c) Weekends, including holidays, and school in-service days 
preceding or following weekends; (d) Decision-making and responsibility; (e) 
Information sharing and access; (f) Relocation of parents; (g) Telephone access; 
(h) Transportation; and (i) Methods for resolving disputes”); see also HAW. REV. 
STAT. ANN. § 571-46.5 (West 2015). 
109. 1995 Tex. Gen. Laws 119, 123, 147-58 (using “managing 
conservatorship,” “possessory conservatorship,” and “access” instead of 
“custody” and “visitation”). 
110. 1995 Me. Laws 1939 (substituting “parental responsibility” and 
“parent-child contact” for “custody” and “visitation”). 
111. 1997 Mont. Laws 1570, 1572-73 (substituting “parenting” and 
“parental contact” for “custody” and “visitation,” respectively). 
112. 1998 Colo. Sess. Laws 1376 (changing the term “custody” to “parental 
responsibility” and “visitation” to “parenting time”). 
113. 2005 N.H. Laws 622-26 (adopting a new chapter referring to 
“parental rights and responsibilities” instead of parental “custody” and 
“visitation”). 
114. See discussion infra Section IV.B.3. 
115. 2005 N.D. Laws 609, 611-12, 619 (referring to “parental rights and 
responsibilities,” “parenting schedule,” and “residential responsibility” in lieu 
of “custody” and “visitation”). 
116. 2012 Ariz. Sess. Laws 1816-18 (substituting “legal decision-making 
and parenting time” for custody and defining “visitation” as time the child 
spends with someone other than a parent). 
117. See supra notes 110-116. 
20http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol36/iss2/2
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conservatorship.”118 
These states also eliminated references to “visitation” when 
addressing a parent’s time with a child,119 although several still 
use the term when providing for third-party rights of access to a 
child or in situations involving inappropriate parental conduct 
that results in limitations on contact with a child.120  In addition, 
at least two states that still retain references to “custody” within 
statutory text have eliminated “visitation” when addressing the 
parent-child relationship.121  The most popular alternatives to 
“visitation” include variations on “parenting” followed by “time,” 
“schedule,” or “contact.”122 
In some states, it was evident whether the revisions in 
nomenclature were intended to substantively alter custody 
standards or were merely semantic.123  The Colorado legislature 
 
118. See supra note 109 and accompanying text. 
119. Although the statutory text has been amended in all eight 
jurisdictions to eliminate the references to “custody” and “visitation” when 
addressing parental rights and access, the terms still remain in the titles of 
statutes in two states.  MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-4-201, et seq. (West 2015) (titling 
Title 40, Chapter 4 as “Termination of Marriage, Child Custody, Support,” with 
Part 2 of that Chapter titled “Support, Custody, Visitation, and Related 
Provisions”); N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 14-09-06.3 (West 2015) (permitting 
investigations into parenting rights and responsibilities in contested cases in 
a section titled Custody Investigations and Reports). 
120. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-401(7) (2015) (defining 
“visitation” as “a schedule of time that occurs with a child by someone other 
than a legal parent”); ME. REV.STAT. tit. 19-A, § 1653(6)-(7) (2015) (restricting 
contact when there have been instances of domestic violence, conviction of 
sexual offenses, or prior violations of an order of contact and access); ME. REV. 
STAT. tit. 19-A, § 1801, et seq. (2015) (establishing grandparent visitation 
rights); MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-4-228 (West 2015) (addressing custody and 
visitation issues between a parent and a third-party); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 
461-A:13 (2015) (providing grandparent visitation rights); TEX. FAM. CODE 
ANN. § 153.014 (West 2015) (establishing visitation centers and visitation 
exchange facilities for use during periods of possession and access in cases 
requiring supervision or other monitoring). 
121. In 1996, Michigan amended its Child Custody Act of 1970, MICH. 
COMP. LAWS ANN. § 722.21, et seq. (West 2015) to substitute “parenting time” 
in lieu of “visitation.”  1996 Mich. Pub. Acts 937.  Similarly, the Kansas 
legislature eliminated “visitation” in favor of “parenting time” six years later.  
2012 Kan. Sess. Laws 1577. 
122. See supra notes 109-12, 115-16. 
123. But see infra notes 172-74 and accompanying text (discussing the 
uncertainty created in Florida as a result of the nomenclature changes); see 
also Gary L. Crippen, Minnesota’s Alternatives to Primary Caretaker 
Placements: Too Much of a Good Thing?, 28 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 677, 689-90 
21
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made it clear that the nomenclature changes did not impact the 
rights and responsibilities associated with traditional awards of 
“custody” or “visitation”: 
 
On and after July 1, 1993, the term “visitation” 
has been changed to “parenting time.”  It is not 
the intent of the general assembly to modify or 
change the meaning of the term “visitation” nor to 
alter the legal rights of a parent with respect to 
the child as a result of changing the term 
“visitation” to “parenting time.” 
 
On and after February 1, 1999, the term “custody” 
and related terms such as “custodial” and 
“custodian” have been changed to “parental 
responsibilities”.  It is not the intent of the general 
assembly to modify or change the meaning of the 
term “custody” nor to alter the legal rights of any 
custodial parent with respect to the child as a 
result of changing the term “custody” to “parental 
responsibilities.”124 
 
In contrast, in other states the new terminology reflected 
extensive changes in how child placement and contact issues 
were resolved as entirely new code sections were adopted.125 
The states eliminating custody and visitation still use the 
terms in connection with uniform laws adopted within the 
jurisdiction and in implementing legislation enacted to give 
 
(2001) (indicating there was uncertainty whether new authority was created 
for judges to impose parenting plans absent parental agreement following 
Minnesota’s adoption of statutes providing for plans that eliminated 
traditional custodial labels). 
124. COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14-10-103(3)-(4) (West 2015). 
125. See, e.g., New Hampshire, 2005 N.H. Laws 622-26 (adopting a new 
chapter referring to “parental rights and responsibilities” instead of parental 
“custody” and “visitation”); Texas, 1995 Tex. Gen. Laws 123-24 (developing a 
new statutory system providing for “managing conservatorship,” “possessory 
conservatorship,” and “access” instead of “custody” and “visitation”).  See infra 
Section IV.B.3 for a detailed discussion of the extent of amendments to the 
Florida Statutes. 
22http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol36/iss2/2
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effect to federal statutes.126  To ensure that orders not containing 
the term “custody” are properly interpreted for purposes of 
enforcement under statutes such as the Uniform Child Custody 
Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act and the Parental Kidnapping 
Prevention Act, some states have adopted provisions that make 
clear the legislative intent.127  The language used in such 
statutes is similar to that adopted by New Hampshire: 
 
[a]ny provision of law that refers to the “custody” 
of minor children shall mean the allocation of 
parental rights and responsibilities as provided in 
this chapter.  Any provision of law which refers to 
a “custodial parent” shall mean a parent with 50 
percent or more of the residential responsibility 
and any reference to a non-custodial parent shall 
mean a parent with less than 50 percent of the 
residential responsibility.128 
 
In light of this growing trend to eliminate “custody” and 
“visitation,” and in some cases revise custody standards and the 
procedure for making custody determinations, an analysis of 
Florida’s experience gives some guidance on how branding 
principles could be applied to shift social behavior in the custody 
litigation arena as it has been used in issues involving public 
health concerns.  The revisions to Florida’s statutes are in many 
ways typical of amendments adopted in other states and provide 
a reasonable framework to discuss the utility of branding 
principles in the context of custody litigation. 
 
3.  Florida’s Statutory Revisions 
 
The revisions to the Florida Statutes illustrate how the 
value proposition associated with custody litigation has 
undergone major shifts.  As a result, it presents a useful model 
 
126. See, e.g., N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-09.3-01, et seq. (West 2015) (adopting 
the Uniform Deployed Parents Custody and Visitation Act); N.D. CENT. CODE 
§ 14-14.1-01, et seq. (West 2015) (adopting the Uniform Child Custody 
Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act). 
127. See, e.g., N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-09-33 (West 2015). 
128. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 461-A:20 (West 2015). 
23
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to discuss how branding principles could be used to effectuate 
changes in parents’ behavior during the litigation of their 
disputes.  A review of the amendments that went into effect on 
October 1, 2008, is a helpful starting point.129 
The word “custody” was not part of Florida’s original divorce 
statutes, enacted in 1828.130  Since major revisions in 1971 to the 
Florida Statutes governing divorce actions,131 one thing 
remained constant – divorcing parties were required to agree to, 
or the court would adjudicate “custody” and “visitation” rights.132  
Presumably, because the terms “custody” and “visitation” were 
intended to have their everyday plain meaning, they were not 
defined in divorce statutes, unlike the term “primary residential 
parent,” introduced and defined in the 1982 legislation, which 
marked the first major revision in custody standards.133  In an 
attempt to reduce animosity associated with custody litigation, 
the term “primary residential parent” was adopted in the Shared 
Parental Responsibility Act in 1982 as a more neutral term to 
avoid references to the “care, custody, and control” of a child by 
parents.134  Use of “primary residential parent” avoided 
references to custody and was defined as “the parent with whom 
the child maintains his or her primary residence.”135  Still, the 
term “custody” remained in the statute governing child 
placement decisions following divorce.136 
The next major revisions occurred in 2008 when the word 
“custody” was completely eliminated from the divorce statutes, 
as were the phrases “primary residential parent” and “visitation 
rights”137 in divorce138 actions.  The unstated (yet clear) goal of 
 
129. For ease of references, these statutory revisions are referred to as the 
“2008 amendments” throughout this article. 
130. 1828 Fla. Laws 12. 
131. 1971 Fla. Laws 1319 et seq. 
132. FLA. STAT. § 61.13 (2007). 
133. Renee Goldenberg, Practical Aspects of Parenting Conflicts: 
Preparing Parents for Litigation, 72 FLA. B.J. 54, 58 (1998). 
134. Id. at 54. 
135. FLA. STAT. § 61.046(3) (2007). 
136. FLA. STAT. § 61.13 (1982). 
137. See generally 2008 Fla. Laws 788-848. 
138. Although the terminology in the Florida Statutes was changed from 
“divorce” to “dissolution of marriage,” in 1971, 1971 Fla. Laws 1319, never, in 
twenty-five years of private practice, did clients tell this author that they 
wanted their marriage dissolved; instead, they wanted a divorce.  The fact that 
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the 2008 legislative revisions of the terminology associated with 
custody proceedings in Florida139 was the same goal that had 
previously resulted in the 1982 amendments – to reduce the 
animosity prevalent in custody litigation between parents 
because of the deleterious effect parent behavior has on a 
child.140  When the word “custody” was stricken from the title of 
Chapter 61 of the Florida Statutes, which governs divorce 
cases,141 “time-sharing” was inserted in its place.142  This 
modification at the outset of the chapter foreshadows the 
significant changes promulgated by the 2008 Florida legislature.  
The different terminology and accompanying new definitions are 
coupled with a requirement imposed on both the parents and the 
court that final judgments in divorce actions involving a minor 
child must include a detailed “parenting plan” developed 
through agreement by the parents, or, if necessary, imposed by 
the judge.143 
 
a.  Parenting Plans 
 
The term “parenting plan” first appeared in connection with 
 
the general public has not adopted the “new” nomenclature as part of everyday 
vernacular after almost 45 years have passed since the statutory change, 
suggests that it is questionable whether changes in statutory terminology in 
connection with custody cases will become part of everyday usage.  For 
consistency, “divorce” is used throughout this article. 
139. Ironically, the synopsis of the matters addressed in the 2008 
statutory revisions starts with “[a]n act relating to child custody . . . .” and then 
proceeds to eliminate the word “custody” from the Florida Statutes addressing 
the parent/child relationship. 2008 Fla. Laws 788. 
140. Since 1971, FLA. STAT. § 61.001(2)(c) (2015) has stated: “[Chapter 
61’s] purposes are:  . . . To mitigate the potential harm to the spouses and their 
children caused by the process of legal dissolution of marriage.”  See also 
Michael P. Sampson, Home Court Advantage: Jurisdictional Disputes in Time-
Sharing Cases, in STRATEGIES FOR FAMILY LAW IN FLORIDA: LEADING LAWYERS 
ON EDUCATING CLIENTS, HANDLING DIVORCE CASES, AND NAVIGATING EMERGING 
ISSUES IN FAMILY LAW 83 (2011). 
141. Although the Chapter refers to dissolution of marriage, § 61.13 sets 
forth issues relating to child placement and contact and access between parties 
and their children that are applicable in paternity actions, see, e.g., Stepp v. 
Stepp, 520 So. 2d 314 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1988), as well as actions seeking an 
“injunction for protection against domestic violence.” FLA. STAT. § 741.30(3)(b) 
(2015). 
142. 2008 Fla. Laws 789-90. 
143. FLA. STAT. § 61.046(13) (2008); FLA. STAT. § 61.13(2)(a)-(b) (2015). 
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Florida custody litigation in a 2001 report of the Florida Family 
Court Steering Committee submitted to the Florida Supreme 
Court.144  The term was not defined and was used only once in 
the thirty-five page report in connection with a recommendation 
that case management commence with careful screening of the 
litigants to determine if there is a history of domestic violence, 
if referral to social service agencies is required, and if there is a 
“need to address emotional issues before the parties are expected 
to negotiate appropriate parenting plans[.]”145  Following that 
report and prior to the 2008 statutory revisions, the phrase 
appeared in only six appellate cases.146  In none of those 
opinions, however, did an appellate court utilize the term in its 
analysis.  Rather, the phrase appeared in four appellate opinions 
only as direct quotations from the trial court’s order or final 
judgment,147 in one case as direct quotations from the trial 
court’s order and a statement of the arguments raised by one of 
the parties,148 and in one case as part of the analysis of an out-
 
144. See In re Report of the Fam. Ct. Steering Comm., 794 So. 2d 518 (Fla. 
2001). 
145. Id. at 540. 
146. See Fredman v. Fredman, 960 So. 2d 52, 58-59 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 
2007); Briscoe v. Briscoe, 927 So. 2d 112, 113 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2006); 
Fredman v. Fredman, 917 So. 2d 1038, 1041 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2006); Rao-
Nagineni v. Rao, 895 So. 2d 1160, 1160 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2005); Wade v. 
Hirschman, 872 So. 2d 952, 954-55 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2004), overruled by, 
Wade v. Hirschman, 903 So. 2d 928, 941 (Fla. 2005) (the Florida Supreme 
Court did not use the term in its opinion, but referred to a “parenting 
coordinator plan”); Feger v. Feger, 850 So. 2d 611, 614 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 
2003).  In addition, the terminology is found in the West syllabus and 
headnotes in Watt v. Watt, 966 So. 2d 455 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2007), but does 
not appear in the opinion itself.  The use of the terminology by West may be 
attributed to the growing trend among other states to use the phrase. 
147. Briscoe, 927 So. 2d at 113 (“[t]he circuit court denied the 
supplemental petition, ruling in relevant part that . . . ‘the co-parenting split 
parenting plan . . . is not unworkable and doomed to failure’”); Fredman, 917 
So. 2d at 1041 (“[a]dditionally, the trial court found that ‘the Mother's move to 
Texas would certainly impede the parties [sic] ability to implement the 
parenting plan designed in the Marital Settlement Agreement’”); Rao-
Nagineni, 895 So. 2d at 1160 (“[t]he court then rendered a ‘Final Judgment of 
Equitable Distribution, Parenting Plan and Child Support’”); Feger, 850 So. 2d 
at 614 (“the [trial] court stated that it ‘continues to believe and therefore finds 
that it did create a parenting plan’”). 
148. In Wade, 872 So. 2d at 954-55, appellant argued that appellee’s 
failure to comply with the parenting plan was not a substantial change in 
circumstances, and the appellate court quoted from the trial court’s order: 
“[f]ailure to comply with the parenting plan may be considered contempt and 
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of-state appellate decision where that state uses the phrase 
“parenting plan” in its custody statutes.149  The undefined term 
also appeared in pre-2008 Administrative Orders issued by at 
least two Florida circuit court chief judges addressing the 
appointment of parenting coordinators.150 
The first definition of the term “parenting plan” appeared in 
the 2008 amendments to Chapter 61: 
 
“Parenting plan” means a document created to 
govern the relationship between the parents 
relating to decisions that must be made regarding 
the minor child and must contain a time-sharing 
schedule for the parents and child.  The issues 
concerning the minor child may include, but are 
not limited to, the child’s education, health care, 
and physical, social, and emotional well-being.  In 
creating the plan, all circumstances between the 
parents, including their historic relationship, 
domestic violence, and other factors must be taken 
into consideration.151 
  
The definition is broad and it appears that the typical final 
judgment or marital settlement agreement including general 
language that the parties will have shared parental 
 
could affect the parties' visitation and/or custody rights.” 
149. In Fredman, 960 So. 2d at 57-59, “parenting plan” was used to 
discuss a New Mexico case, Jaramillo v. Jaramillo, 823 P.2d 299, 306 (N.M. 
1991), which used the phrase found in New Mexico’s custody statutes. 
150. See, e.g., In Re: Amending Administrative Order Re Parenting 
Coordination in Family Law Cases, No. 06-03 (Fla. Cir. Ct. 2007), 
http://www.jud11.flcourts.org/documents/Administrative_Orders/1-06-
03%20A1-
Amend%20Parenting%20Coordination%20Family%20%20Law%20Cases.pdf; 
In Re: Domestic Relations—Parenting Coordinators in High Conflict Family 
Law Cases, No. 05-39 (Fla. Cir. Ct. July 28, 2005), 
http://flcourts18.org/PDF/05-39.pdf. 
151. FLA. STAT. § 61.046(13) (2008).  Subsequent amendments to the 
definition consisted of punctuation, stylistic, and non-substantive changes that 
also resulted in a renumbering of the statute.  FLA. STAT. § 61.046(14) (2013). 
The definition also requires that the parents develop and agree to the plan, 
which must be approved by the court to be effective; if the parents are unable 
to agree, then the court must establish the plan.  Id. 
27
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responsibility152 might be sufficient to qualify as a parenting 
plan.  Additional 2008 legislative revisions indicate that this is 
not the case.  An entirely new section requires that: 
 
Any parenting plan approved by the court must, 
at minimum, describe in adequate detail how the 
parents will share and be responsible for the daily 
tasks associated with the upbringing of the child, 
the time-sharing schedule arrangements that 
specify the time that the minor child will spend 
with each parent, a designation of who will be 
responsible for any and all forms of health care, 
school-related matters, other activities, and the 
methods and technologies that the parents will 
use to communicate with the child.153 
 
Although the definition of a parenting plan indicates that 
certain issues, such as education and health care may be 
addressed, this new section mandates that the parenting plan 
must identify which parent will be the decision-maker 
concerning many issues.  The presumption that parents will 
have shared parental responsibility of their minor children 
subsequent to their divorce remains unchanged.154  By requiring 
that there be a designation of who has responsibility for 
decisions relating to health care, undefined “school-related 
 
152. The definition for “shared parental responsibility” adopted in 1982 
and which remains unchanged by the new legislation, states that “‘[s]hared 
parental responsibility’ means a court-ordered relationship in which both 
parents retain full parental rights and responsibilities with respect to their 
child and in which both parents confer with each other so that major decisions 
affecting the welfare of the child will be determined jointly.”  FLA. STAT. § 
61.046(16) (2007). 
153. FLA. STAT. § 61.13(2)(b) (2008) (emphasis added).  The 2008 version 
of the statute did not require that an address be designated for purposes of 
school boundary determinations.  Id.  Without the designation of a primary 
residential parent and primary residence of the child, corrective legislation was 
required in 2009 to determine school attendance.  FLA. STAT. § 61.13 (2)(b) 
(2009) (stating that a parenting plan should “includ[e] the address to be used 
for school-boundary determination and registration”). 
154. FLA. STAT. § 61.13(2)(b)(2) (2015) (reflecting that the court is required 
to order shared parental responsibility, unless there is evidence that doing so 
would be detrimental to the best interests of the minor child). 
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matters,”155 and undefined “other activities,” the language of the 
new statutory section intimates that one party should have sole 
parental responsibility,156 at least with respect to those issues 
which must be included in the parenting plan. 
While the court and the parties were always statutorily 
permitted to designate one party with ultimate decision-making 
authority over specific issues related to the child’s welfare, 
notwithstanding the award of shared parental responsibility,157 
the requirement that a designation be made suggests a 
preference that one party be given such ultimate authority.  
Allowing one parent to make decisions affecting the child on 
certain issues may avoid post-divorce disagreements and reduce 
the need for judicial intervention when the parents cannot agree, 
but it runs afoul of the stated public policy “to encourage parents 
to share the rights and responsibilities, and joys, of 
childrearing.”158  Traditionally, the courts have found that 
evidence was insufficient to demonstrate that the presumption 
favoring shared parental responsibility with reference to all 
child welfare related issues was rebutted, absent a showing of 
great detriment to the child.159 
The requirement that parents of young children decide at 
 
155. Whether the legislature intended there to be a difference between 
“education” issues, enumerated in the definitional statute, and “school-related 
matters,” referred to in the section detailing the mandatory provisions that 
must be included in a parenting plan is not clear.  Under strict statutory 
construction, the different word choices indicate that different meanings were 
intended.  It could be argued that “education” is a broad term that refers to 
decisions affecting school selection, while “school-related matters” relate to 
decisions required on a daily basis, such as field trip attendance and extra-
curricular activities.  Trial courts will be required to determine what the 
“school-related matters” required to be addressed in the parenting plan 
actually include. See, e.g., Fazzaro v. Fazzaro, 110 So. 3d 49, 50-52 (Fla. Dist. 
Ct. App. 2013). 
156. The definition of “sole parental responsibility” as a “court-ordered 
relationship in which one parent makes decisions regarding the minor child” 
remains unchanged by the 2008 statutory revisions.  FLA. STAT. § 61.046(17) 
(2007). 
157. FLA. STAT. § 61.13(2)(b)(2)(a) (2007); see, e.g., Kasdorf v. Kasdorf, 931 
So. 2d 257, 258 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2006); Cruz v. Domenech, 905 So. 2d 938, 
940 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2005); Markham v. Markham, 485 So. 2d 1299, 1300 
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1986). 
158. FLA. STAT. § 61.13(2)(b)(1) (2007). 
159. See, e.g., Maslow v. Edwards, 886 So. 2d 1027, 1028 (Fla. Dist. Ct. 
App. 2004). 
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the time of their divorce who will be responsible for certain child-
related obligations during the minority of the child may be 
unrealistic and may result in exacerbated future litigation, 
rather than a reduction in recidivistic enforcement and 
modification actions.160  The requirement that the parenting 
plan include “adequate detail[s]” about “how the parents will 
share and be responsible for the daily tasks associated with the 
upbringing of the child” invites one party (or the court) to micro-
manage the childrearing decisions of the other party.161  What 
constitutes “adequate details” for one trial court judge, may not 
suffice for another.  Even more problematic, deviations from the 
detailed methodology for handling daily tasks associated with 
child-rearing may actually cause an increase in enforcement 
actions, rather than the anticipated decrease. Traditionally, the 
day-to-day tasks for the child have been the responsibility of the 
parent who has the child at any given moment.162  Whether the 
judiciary should be involved in determining the daily parenting 
decisions of divorcing parents is not clear. 
 
b.  Time-Sharing Schedules 
 
In place of “custody” and “visitation” schedules, parents are 
required to fashion a “time-sharing schedule.” A definition is 
included in the statute: “Time-sharing schedule” means a 
timetable that must be included in the parenting plan that 
specifies the time, including overnights and holidays, that a 
minor child will spend with each parent.163 
The term “time-sharing” is not a new term in Florida divorce 
actions;164 however, this is the first time it was statutorily 
defined.  In addition, although time-sharing may have been used 
in the past, it has typically been used as a substitute for, or in 
conjunction with, the word “visitation” consistent with the 
 
160. See Mabry, supra note 92. 
161. FLA. STAT. § 61.13(2)(b) (2008). 
162. See generally Kuharcik v. Kuharcik, 629 So. 2d 224, 225 (Fla. Dist. 
Ct. App. 1993). 
163. FLA. STAT. § 61.046(22) (2008). 
164. “Time-sharing” first appeared in the Florida Supreme Court 
approved Family Court forms in 1998.  In re Amendments to the Florida 
Family Law Rules, 713 So. 2d 1 (Fla. 1998). 
30http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol36/iss2/2
  
2016 CHILD “CUSTODY” LITIGATION 405 
parental relocation statutes165 or when visitation is awarded to 
the non-custodial parent.166 
 
c.  Factors to Be Considered in Developing a Parenting 
Plan that Includes a Time-Sharing Schedule 
 
The best interest of the minor child still controls the 
determination of how parental responsibilities will be divided 
between the parents and the time that each parent will spend 
with the minor child.167  Previously, Florida courts were required 
to evaluate twelve specific factors to determine parental 
responsibility, primary residence, and visitation, plus were 
given the typical discretion to include any additional factors the 
court deemed relevant.168  The 2008 amendments eliminated 
several factors,169 but added others, bringing the total number of 
specified factors to nineteen (plus the catch-all anything else 
deemed relevant) “affecting the welfare and interests of the 
 
165. FLA. STAT.  § 61.13001(7)(c) (2007). 
166. Fla. Fam. L. Forms 12.905(a); Fla. Fam. L. Forms 12.993(a). 
167. FLA. STAT. § 61.13(3) (2008). 
168. FLA. STAT. § 61.13(3) (2007). 
169. The factors that have been eliminated from FLA. STAT. § 61.13(3) 
(2007) are: 
 
(a) The parent who is more likely to allow the child frequent 
and continuing contact with the nonresidential parent. 
(b) The love, affection, and other emotional ties existing 
between the parents and the child. 
(c) The capacity and disposition of the parents to provide the 
child with food, clothing, medical care or other remedial care 
recognized and permitted under the laws of this state in lieu 
of medical care, and other material needs. 
 (e) The permanence, as a family unit, of the existing or 
proposed custodial home. 
 (j) The willingness and ability of each parent to facilitate and 
encourage a close and continuing parent-child relationship 
between the child and the other parent. 
(k) Evidence that any party has knowingly provided false 
information to the court regarding a domestic violence 
proceeding pursuant to s. 741.30. 
(l) Evidence of domestic violence or child abuse. 
(m) Any other fact considered by the court to be relevant. 
 
FLA. STAT. § 61.13(3)(a)-(c), (e), (j)-(m) (2007). 
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[particular] child, [and the circumstances of that family]” that 
must be considered to determine the best interests of the child 
when formulating a parenting plan and time-sharing 
schedule.170  The spirit and intent of the factors that were 
 
170. The twenty factors listed under FLA. STAT. § 61.13(3) (2008) are: 
 
(a) The demonstrated capacity and disposition of each parent 
to facilitate and encourage a close and continuing parent-
child relationship, to honor the time-sharing schedule, and to 
be reasonable when changes are required. 
(b) The anticipated division of parental responsibilities after 
the litigation, including the extent to which parental 
responsibilities will be delegated to third parties. 
(c) The demonstrated capacity and disposition of each parent 
to determine, consider, and act upon the needs of the child as 
opposed to the needs or desires of the parent. 
(d) The length of time the child has lived in a stable, 
satisfactory environment and the desirability of maintaining 
continuity. 
(e) The geographic viability of the parenting plan, with 
special attention paid to the needs of school-age children and 
the amount of time to be spent traveling to effectuate the 
parenting plan. This factor does not create a presumption for 
or against relocation of either parent with a child. 
(f) The moral fitness of the parents. 
(g) The mental and physical health of the parents. 
(h) The home, school, and community record of the child. 
(i) The reasonable preference of the child, if the court deems 
the child to be of sufficient intelligence, understanding, and 
experience to express a preference. 
(j) The demonstrated knowledge, capacity, and disposition of 
each parent to be informed of the circumstances of the minor 
child, including, but not limited to, the child's friends, 
teachers, medical care providers, daily activities, and favorite 
things. 
(k) The demonstrated capacity and disposition of each parent 
to provide a consistent routine for the child, such as 
discipline, and daily schedules for homework, meals, and 
bedtime. 
(l) The demonstrated capacity of each parent to communicate 
with and keep the other parent informed of issues and 
activities regarding the minor child, and the willingness of 
each parent to adopt a unified front on all major issues when 
dealing with the child. 
(m) Evidence of domestic violence, sexual violence, child 
abuse, child abandonment, or child neglect, regardless of 
whether a prior or pending action relating to those issues has 
been brought. 
32http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol36/iss2/2
  
2016 CHILD “CUSTODY” LITIGATION 407 
eliminated, however, were incorporated in the revised listing of 
factors to be considered.171 
 
(n) Evidence that either parent has knowingly provided false 
information to the court regarding any prior or pending 
action regarding domestic violence, sexual violence, child 
abuse, child abandonment, or child neglect. 
(o) The particular parenting tasks customarily performed by 
each parent and the division of parental responsibilities 
before the institution of litigation and during the pending 
litigation, including the extent to which parenting 
responsibilities were undertaken by third parties. 
(p) The demonstrated capacity and disposition of each parent 
to participate and be involved in the child's school and 
extracurricular activities. 
(q) The demonstrated capacity and disposition of each parent 
to maintain an environment for the child which is free from 
substance abuse. 
(r) The capacity and disposition of each parent to protect the 
child from the ongoing litigation as demonstrated by not 
discussing the litigation with the child, not sharing 
documents or electronic media related to the litigation with 
the child, and refraining from disparaging comments about 
the other parent to the child. 
(s) The developmental stages and needs of the child and the 
demonstrated capacity and disposition of each parent to meet 
the child's developmental needs. 
(t) Any other factor that is relevant to the determination of a 
specific parenting plan, including the time-sharing schedule. 
 
FLA. STAT. § 61.13(3)(a)-(t) (2008). 
171. In many ways, the prior list of thirteen factors allowed more 
discretion to the trial judge because the factors were much more holistic and 
did not specify behaviors.  The revised factors are detailed and may express 
value judgments about what “good” parenting practices are.  For example, 
under the new list of factors, the court must consider which parent is more 
familiar with the child’s “favorite things.”  FLA. STAT. § 61.13(3)(j) (2008).  Pity 
the court that must determine the relative merit of the parents when one 
knows which morning cartoons the child prefers, but the other parent knows 
which major league pitcher is the child’s favorite athlete.  Similarly, the court 
is required to hear evidence about which parent has a “consistent routine . . . 
and daily schedules for homework, meals, and bedtime.”  FLA. STAT. § 
61.13(3)(k) (2008).  The unstated preference here is that the parent who is more 
regimented in adhering to a schedule may have an advantage.  Unfortunately, 
the free-spirited, less schedule-driven parent is apparently viewed less 
favorably, notwithstanding that such parental traits are not necessarily 
deemed detrimental to a child.  That judicial decisions concerning custody and 
child placement are influenced by a judge’s personal biases and values has 
been noted in criticism of the best interest of the child standard.  Daniel A. 
Krauss & Bruce D. Sales, Legal Standards, Expertise, and Experts in the 
Resolution of Contested Child Custody Cases, 6 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 843, 
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The 2008 amendments represent not only nomenclature 
changes, but also revisions in the standards used to evaluate 
custody cases, representing a new value proposition for custody 
litigation.  Those changes include, among other provisions, the 
requirement that parties develop an agreed-upon parenting 
plan, absent which the court makes the determination, a 
requirement that the plan indicate who has ultimate decision-
making rights over certain issues affecting the child, a new 
obligation on both parties to actively participate in childrearing, 
and expanded factors for the court to consider in ordering a 
parenting plan.  With this new value proposition placing the 
onus on parents to assume more responsibility for resolving 
parenting issues, a rebranding of custody litigation is necessary 
for the transition to succeed and for the goal of reduced acrimony 
to be achieved. 
 
V. The Florida Experience in Rebranding Custody Litigation 
 
A. Reactions by Judges, Attorneys, and Litigants 
 
Now that seven years have passed since the 2008 
amendments were adopted, a body of case law is developing that 
offers some perspective on whether the changes are achieving 
the goals of reduced acrimony during litigation and a shift in 
parents’ perspective of their roles post-divorce.  Following the 
October 1, 2008, effective date of the amendments, many courts 
struggled with adapting to the new nomenclature.  The effect of 
the new value proposition was not clear to judges and lawyers, 
those who were charged with implementing the new brand 
promise of a less acrimonious divorce.  Several early court 
decisions referred to the terms “parenting plan” and “time-
sharing” as replacing “custody” and “visitation,”172 but 
 
859-60 (2000). 
172. LiFleur v. Webster, 138 So. 3d 570, 576 n.1 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2014) 
(citation omitted) (“In October 2008, the Florida Legislature amended Chapter 
61, Florida Statutes, and changed the term ‘custody’ to ‘parental responsibility’ 
and ‘visitation’ to ‘timesharing.’”); Mudafort v. Lee, 62 So. 3d 1196, 1197 n.1 
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2011) (stating that “the concept of ‘custody’ was replaced 
with ‘time-sharing’”); Cobo v. Sierralta, 13 So. 3d 493, 501 n.4 (Fla. Dist. Ct. 
App. 2009) (acknowledging that while the 2008 amendments eliminated 
references “to ‘custody,’ ‘primary residence,’ ‘primary residential parent,’ and 
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questioned the import of the statutory changes173 and the 
applicability of prior case law, creating unresolved conflicts 
between the appellate courts.174  Some courts, however, 
appeared to be uncertain whether the new terms were actual 
replacements and which words they replaced.175  This suggests 
a rebranding failure from the inception. 
Because “custody,” “visitation,” and the “primary residential 
 
‘visitation’ in favor of a ‘parenting plan’ that includes ‘time sharing’” courts 
must still consider the best interests of the child); Lombard v. Lombard, 997 
So. 2d 1188, 1189 n.1 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2008) (citation omitted) (“We 
recognize that, effective October 1, 2008, [the statutory amendments], replaced 
the terms ‘custody’ and ‘visitation’ with the concept of a ‘parenting plan’ that 
includes ‘time-sharing.’”). 
173. In the dissenting opinion in Corey v. Corey, a case considering the 
trial court’s pre-2008 order on rotating custody, Senior Judge Alan Schwartz 
mussed “[w]hile we need not consider the broad revision of the statutory family 
. . . which took effect on October 1, 2008, . . . I wonder whether the changes in 
form and nomenclature, with which it is mostly concerned, significantly affect 
the previously established substantive law.” Corey v. Corey, 29 So. 3d 315, 321 
n.5 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2009). 
174. See Lombard, 997 So. 2d at 1189 n.1 (finding that the 2008 
amendments require that the parenting plan and time-sharing schedule be 
determined after consideration of the child’s best interests and consequently 
“is consistent with prior law”).  Cf. Mudafort, 62 So. 3d at1197 n.1 (finding that 
the 2008 amendments eliminated the presumption against rotating custody, 
which the court found had been replaced by “equal time-sharing,” and that the 
factors under Mancuso v. Mancuso, 789 So. 2d 1249 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2001) 
that were to be considered to determine if the presumption had been overcome, 
were no longer relevant); Bainbridge v. Pratt, 68 So.3d 310, 314 (Fla. Dist. Ct. 
App. 2011) (acknowledging that the presumption against rotating custody no 
longer existed, but finding that the Mancuso factors were still applicable to 
determine whether an equal time-sharing plan was in a child’s best interests). 
175. “It appears that the trial court has confused the terms ‘visitation’ and 
‘time-sharing,’ using visitation to mean what section 61.13(2)(c), Florida 
Statutes (2010), refers to as time-sharing and using the term ‘majority time-
sharing’ when referring to the determination of which party will be the child’s 
primary residential parent.”  Mayo v. Mayo, 87 So. 3d 820, 821 (Fla. Dist. Ct. 
App. 2012).  In a footnote, the court went on to state, “[a] 2008 amendment to 
the statute removed the word ‘visitation’ from chapter 61 and replaced it in 
some instances with the term ‘parenting plan’ and in other places, such as 
section 61.13(2)(c), with the term ‘time-sharing.’” Id. at n.1. (citation omitted).  
Similarly, in Bainbridge v. Pratt, the court stated that the 2008 amendments 
“abolished the concept of custody and replaced it with ‘parenting plans’ and 
‘time-sharing[.]’”  Bainbridge v. Pratt, 68 So. 3d 310, 313 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 
2011).  In addressing whether a rotating schedule was in the child’s best 
interest under the new statute, the court went on to refer to the schedule as 
“rotating custody,” a “rotating parenting plan,” and a “rotating time-sharing 
plan.” Id. at 313-14. 
35
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parent” designation were eliminated prospectively, most 
appellate cases well into 2012176 applied prior versions of the 
statute and still used the eliminated terms when reviewing trial 
court orders because the cases were filed before the effective date 
of the statutory amendments.177  Many courts, both at the trial 
and appellate levels, however, attempted to incorporate the 
concepts of a parenting plan and time-sharing into the 
judgments entered and opinions issued, some even pre-dating 
the effective date of the amendments,178 while still applying the 
prior statute, resulting in “custody,” “visitation,” “parenting 
plan,” “time-sharing,” and “primary residential parent” being 
muddled into the same case.179 
In actions filed subsequent to the 2008 amendments, 
references to the prior designations, even when applying the new 
statutory scheme, continued to plague litigants,180 
 
176. Pursuant to directives from the Florida Supreme Court, contested 
family law cases should ideally be resolved at the trial court level within 6 
months of filing.  That appellate courts were still applying the prior statute in 
cases well into 2011 evidences that fact that litigation over child placement 
issues are not often resolved in the preferred time period.  FLA. R. JUD. ADMIN. 
2.250(a)(1)(C). 
177. See, e.g., Knowles v. Knowles, 79 So. 3d 870, 871 n.1 (Fla. Dist. Ct. 
App. 2012) (acknowledging that “the pre-2008 terminology” must be used in 
reviewing “custody” orders in cases filed before the effective date of the 
amendments). 
178. See, e.g., J.L.B. v. S.J.B., 135 So. 3d 468 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2014) 
(reviewing an order modifying the parenting plan contained in a September 
2008 final judgment, predating the October 1, 2008, effective date for the 
amendments); Justice v. Justice, 80 So. 3d 405 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2012) 
(reversing and remanding an internally inconsistent final judgment in an 
action filed in 2007 that went to final hearing in 2009 and awarded the mother 
the “majority of timesharing” and the father “visitation” consistent with a 
temporary relief order entered pre-2008 that designated the mother the 
“primary residential parent”). 
179. See infra notes 178-193 and accompanying text. 
180. In Sparks v. Sparks, an action filed post-2008, two pro se litigants 
entered into a marital settlement agreement that provided for both “joint 
custody” and a “schedule of rotating physical custody.”  Sparks v. Sparks, 75 
So. 3d 861, 861 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2011).  In reversing the final judgment that 
incorporated the agreement for failure to consider the father’s claim that the 
agreement was contrary to the best interests of the child, the appellate court 
repeatedly referred to custody and visitation without mentioning “time-
sharing,” although the action was filed after the effective date of the 
amendments and the court cited the 2010 version of the statute.  Id. at 862.  
Similarly, in Neuman v. Harper, a post-2008 paternity action, the mother 
challenged a final judgment awarding the father majority time-sharing, 
36http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol36/iss2/2
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practitioners,181 and judges.182  When dealing with pro se 
litigants, trial courts were inclined to resort to the traditional 
vernacular and eschewed the statutory nomenclature changes 
because the parents themselves continued to use the terms 
“custody” and “visitation.”183  In addition, courts found it difficult 
 
claiming that the father did not seek designation as the primary residential 
parent in his petition and the judgment did not state “how it is in the best 
interest of the child to designate a Primary Residential Parent.”  Neuman v. 
Harper, 106 So. 3d 974, 976 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2013).  In finding the trial court 
did not abuse its discretion, the court stated, “[w]hile the final judgment does 
not specifically designate a ‘primary residential parent,’ the time-sharing 
schedule placed [the minor child] with the father in the role of what 
traditionally would have been considered the primary residential parent.” Id.  
See also Waybright v. Johnson-Smith, 115 So. 3d 445 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2013). 
181. See, e.g., Campbell v. Campbell, 100 So. 3d 763, 764 (Fla. Dist. Ct. 
App. 2012) (where mother, through counsel, filed a “Motion to Maintain 
Primary Residential Custodianship”).  Practitioners acknowledge that the 
term “custody” is still popularly used, despite the statutory changes.  Bruce A. 
Christensen, Divorce Case Challenges and Issues in Florida, in STRATEGIES FOR 
FAMILY LAW IN FLORIDA: LEADING LAWYERS ON EDUCATING CLIENTS, HANDLING 
DIVORCE CASES, AND NAVIGATING EMERGING ISSUES IN FAMILY LAW 7 (2011). 
182. See Kelley v. Colston, 32 So. 3d 186 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2010) (finding 
that an order in a case filed after 2008 while initially appearing to grant liberal 
time-sharing, in fact, severely limits the former husband’s visitation) 
(emphasis added); Campbell, 100 So. 3d 763 (reversing, on jurisdictional 
grounds, an order vacating an order that designated the former husband the 
“primary residential parent” after the father sought modification of the 2009 
final judgment incorporating a parenting plan that provided the child would 
reside with the mother and would have timesharing with the child on 
alternating weekends).  At least one court while ordering a time-sharing 
schedule, failed to comply with the obligation to establish a broader parenting 
plan incorporating the schedule consistent with the statutory mandate.  
Munroe v. Olibrice, 83 So. 3d 985 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2012).  See also Pope v. 
Langowski, 115 So. 3d 1076, 1077 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2013) (finding that the 
trial court entered a final judgment “granting primary physical custody to the 
mother and allowing the father more liberal visitation over time,” but 
remanding “for the court to correct . . . two typographical errors in the 
parenting plan”); Fernandez v. Wright, 111 So. 3d 229 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2013) 
(referring to both time-sharing and custody); Shiba v. Gabay, 120 So. 3d 80 
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2013) (referring to custody, timesharing, and visitation); 
Vazquez v. Vazquez-Robelledo, 150 So. 3d 855 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2014) (using 
both “time-sharing” and “visitation”). 
183. In Waybright v. Johnson-Smith, a 2012 paternity action involving 
pro se parties, the father sought “sole physical custody” of the child with 
“supervised visitation” by the mother.  Waybright v. Johnson-Smith, 115 So. 
3d 445, 446 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2013).  The appellate court reversed the trial 
court’s order awarding “rotating custody” because evidence of domestic 
violence was improperly excluded, finding that violence is probative conduct in 
a “child custody case” and there was insufficient evidence under the factors in 
37
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to avoid references to “custody” and “visitation” when discussing 
legal principles developed in prior case law that remain 
applicable under the amended statute.184  Other courts 
continued to rely on model time-sharing and parenting plans 
adopted by their circuits, amended only to reflect cursory 
changes to nomenclature, while also referring to “visitation” and 
“primary residential parent designations.”185  These struggles 
demonstrate that the consumers of the new custody litigation 
paradigm, as well as those executing the process designed to 
promote the new value proposition, did not develop the favorable 
perception that would allow them to reflexively apply the new 
standards.  The positive “attitude” that is seen in successful 
 
the amended statute to “support the weekly rotating custody schedule” 
established by the court.  Id. at 447.  Although the action was filed after 2008, 
the appellate court never used the terms “parenting plan” or time-sharing.”  
See also Sparks, 75 So. 3d at 861; Neuman, 106 So. 3d at 976. 
184. In A.L.G. v. J.F.D., a post-2008 paternity action, the court addressed 
issues relating to time-sharing, but cited to pre-2008 case law as support for 
its statement specific findings of fact are not necessary to support a “custody 
decision.” A.L.G. v. J.F.D., 85 So. 3d 527 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2012).  See also 
AbouElSeoud v. ElBadrawi, 133 So. 3d 1079 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2014) (using 
“custody” when addressing the appellate court’s jurisdiction to hear temporary 
orders under the Florida Rules of Appellate Procedure). 
185. For example, Florida’s 15th Circuit Court’s website has proposed 
timesharing schedules that incorporate the new statutory language in the title, 
but still refer to “visitation,” “primary residential parent,” and “secondary 
residential parent.” Model Parental Timesharing Schedule (In-State Where the 
Parents Reside More than 45 Miles Apart), 15th JUDICIAL COURT OF FLORIDA 
(last visited Jan. 25, 2016), 
http://www.palmbeachbar.org/Family/Model%20Parental%20Time%20Sharin
g%20Schedule%20Colin%20_In-state%20less%20than%2045_.pdf;  Model 
Parental Time-Sharing Schedule (Out-of-State), 15th JUDICIAL COURT OF 
FLORIDA (last visited Jan. 25, 2016), https://15thcircuit.co.palm-
beach.fl.us/documents/10179/23165/Model%20Parental%20Time%20Sharing
%20Schedule%20_Out-of-state_.pdf; 
Florida’s 15th Circuit Court website also uses this language in their model 
orders for supervised visitation.  Order For Supervised Visitation at Family 
Nuturing Center, 15th JUDICIAL COURT OF FLORIDA (last visited Jan. 25, 2016), 
https://15thcircuit.co.palm-
beach.fl.us/documents/10179/104452/UFC_OrderforSupervisedVisitationFNC
.pdf. 
Similarly, the time-sharing guidelines for the 7th Judicial Circuit in Florida, 
adopted by administrative order in 2010, refer to residential and non-
residential parents.  Seventh Judicial Circuit of Florida 
Timesharing/Guidelines, 
http://www.circuit7.org/Administrative%20Orders/family/FM-2010-041-SC-
attach.pdf. 
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rebranding efforts is lacking. 
The confusion as to the effect of the changes, whether they 
were merely semantic or substantive, and inconsistency in 
applying the appropriate terminology demonstrate a failure of 
two of the elements of rebranding necessary to effectively create 
positive impressions of the revisions.186  There was a lack of 
understanding by the courts, attorneys, and litigants of the shift 
in the value proposition and a lack of continuity with the prior 
brand that provided for the designation of a primary residential 
parent to the new brand that places more of an emphasis on co-
parenting and sharing of parenting time. 
In discussing the expected benefit of the new terms 
“parenting plans” and “time-sharing,” one Florida practitioner 
suggested that the introduction of the terms “primary 
residential parent” and “secondary residential parent” in 1982 
in fact caused parents to ignore the best interests of their child. 
187 Parents instead engage in protracted litigation in order to 
“win” the primary designation, which was viewed as 
“superior.”188  Just as there is scant empirical evidence that the 
rejection of the term “custodial parent” in favor of a more neutral 
term in 1982 with the adoption of the “primary residential 
parent designation” resulted in any decrease in litigation 
between warring parents,189 it is questionable whether the latest 
nomenclature change will have a significant impact on the 
nature of custody litigation in Florida, a fact recognized by even 
those who were proponents of the legislative changes.190 
 
186. See supra notes 47 & 51 and accompanying text. 
187. Elisha D. Roy, The End of Custody in Florida: Finally Parents are 
Just Parents, 82 FLA. B. J. 49, 49 (2008). 
188. Id. 
189. Several writers make the claim that the use of “custody” encourages 
the adversarial nature of the litigation involving children after divorce, but do 
not cite to authority for this claim.  See, e.g., Michelle A. Tarnelli, Note, Joint 
Custody Presumption in Vermont: A Proposal for Co-Parenting, 36 VT. L. REV. 
1015, 1024 (2012). 
190. Roy acknowledges that it is unlikely that the nomenclature changes 
would have an impact on the nature of custody cases that were tried, but 
opined that the number of custody trials would decline.  Roy, supra note 187, 
at 50.  See also Alexa Welzien, Note & Comment, Life, Liberty, and the Pursuit 
of Parental Equality: Florida’s New Parenting Plan Remains Overshadowed by 
Lingering Gender Bias, 33 NOVA L. REV. 509, 519 (2009) (quoting Florida Board 
Certified in Marital and Family Law practitioner and then President-Elect of 
the American Academy of Matrimonial Lawyers, Roberta G. Stanley, as she 
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This skepticism may be well-placed given the behavior of 
litigants, practitioners, and judges.  Regardless of what terms 
are used, parents are cognizant that typically one parent is 
receiving more time with the child, and will refer to their time 
with the child as having “custody” of the child.191  Courts 
acknowledge that there is still a difference in the amount of time 
one parent is awarded using the new “time-sharing” vernacular; 
because of the elimination of the “primary residential parent” 
designation, many judges now award “majority time-sharing” to 
one parent.192  Parents still litigate over who will have more 
overnights with the child because of the financial impact on child 
support.193  The amount of child support still remains linked to 
the amount of time each parent spends with the child.194 
By eliminating the definition of primary residential parent 
the legislature also eliminated any definition of a “primary 
residence” for the child.195  Notwithstanding the lack of a 
definition, however, the child either “primarily” resides at one 
parent’s residence, meaning more overnights are spent in that 
parent’s home, or the child truly has no “primary” residence and 
rotates equal amounts of time between the parents’ residences 
in a joint physical custody arrangement.196  This fact will not be 
changed by revisions in nomenclature.  Without the designation 
of a primary residential parent, neither parent then has 
 
questioned whether the legislative changes would accomplish the goal of 
reducing animosity and noted that parents already inclined to cooperate would 
develop reasonable parenting plans, while those engaged in high conflict 
litigation would likely experience increased conflict). 
191. See supra note 178 & 181 and accompanying text. 
192. See supra note 176. 
193. Christensen, supra note 181. 
194. FLA. STAT. § 61.30 (2015).  Until the amount of time a parent spends 
with a child can be divorced from the amount of child support a parent is 
expected to pay, mere changes in nomenclature are unlikely to have an impact 
on parents’ behavior in custody matters. 
195. The definition of the “principal residence of a child” “mean[ing] the 
home of the designated primary residential parent” was stricken.  2008 Fla. 
Laws 803.  Perhaps an additional amendment should have been included 
requiring that the minor child be instructed that, if questioned about where he 
lives, he is to answer that he doesn’t live anywhere – he just shares time with 
his parents. 
196. Although FLA. STAT. § 61.121 (2007), which stated that the court was 
permitted to order rotating custody, if found to be in the child’s best interest, 
was repealed, it would appear that the repeal of the statute was related more 
to the usage of the word “custody.”  2008 Fla. Laws 792. 
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“visitation” with the child.  Instead, there is a schedule of “time-
sharing” between each parent and the child as established in the 
newly-created “parenting plan.”197  What is further significant 
about the legislation is that parenting is now considered a duty, 
rather than a privilege,198 a growing trend developing in the 
United States addressed earlier.199 
Even more complex difficulties exemplifying the lack of 
continuity between the old brand and the new have arisen in 
enforcement and modification actions in cases resolved under 
the pre-2008 statute where one party was designated the 
primary residential parent, with the non-residential parent 
receiving a specified schedule of visitation.200  Supplemental 
actions for enforcement or modification of judgments affecting 
the placement of or contact with a child continues with those 
designations, although the courts occasionally incorporate the 
new nomenclature.201  In contrast, those parents whose initial 
actions relating to a minor child were filed subsequent to the 
effective date of the amendments no longer can be designated 
the primary residential parent or awarded visitation.202 
Similarly, in actions to enforce or modify out-of-state orders 
 
197. FLA. STAT. §§ 61.046, 61.13 (2008). 
198. FLA. STAT. § 61.45 (2008). 
199. See supra notes 88-90 and accompanying text. 
200. See Lombard v. Lombard, 997 So. 2d 1188, 1189-90 (Fla. Dist. Ct. 
App. 2008) (visitation is awarded to the non-custodial parent, when a primary 
residential parent is designated; the primary residential parent does not have 
visitation with the child; by definition, the child spends less time with the non-
custodial parent). 
201. See, e.g., Ginnell v. Pacetti, 31 So. 3d 217 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2010) 
(referring to both “time-sharing” and supervised “visitation” in a final order 
following contempt hearings in September 2008 (pre-amendment) and January 
2009 (post-amendment) based on a January 2008 final judgment); Rossman v. 
Profera, 67 So. 3d 363 (Fla.  Dist. Ct. App. 2011) (affirming modification of 
“custody” of a minor child initially awarded to the mother pursuant to a 
mediated settlement agreement in a 2004 divorce and designating the father 
as the primary residential parent); Kershaw v. Kershaw, 141 So. 3d 642 (Fla. 
Dist. Ct. App. 2014) (considering modification of a “parenting plan” that 
awarded “primary custody” to the mother and “visitation” to the father); 
LiFleur v. Webster, 138 So. 3d 570, 571 n.1 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2014) 
(“[b]ecause the relevant facts of this case took place both before and after the 
amendments to Chapter 61, this opinion sets forth the history of this case using 
the terms as they were used by the parties and the court during the course of 
the proceedings below”). 
202. FLA. STAT. § 61.13 (2008). 
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or judgments domesticated in Florida, courts have incorporated 
references to time-sharing while also referring to the custody 
and visitation provisions of the sister state’s order.203  When 
dealing with parties divorced pursuant to a foreign country’s 
jurisdiction, however, there appears to be less of an interest in 
using the new language.204  
Because the prospective application of the amendments 
does not eliminate the rights (and responsibilities) created under 
judgments based on the prior statutory language205 a dual 
system of “parenting” has been created.  Those whose actions 
pre-dated 2008 typically having a primary residential or 
custodial parent for their child, a designation that continues 
even if there have been subsequent modification actions, while 
no parent whose action was initiated post-2008 has custody of 
their child.  If judges and lawyers are confused about the 
differences in standards as evidenced in court opinions and court 
filings, laypersons must be even more perplexed given that their 
 
203. See, e.g., Cheek v. Hesik, 73 So. 3d 340 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2011) 
(ordering make-up “time-sharing” where the father’s “visitation” rights under 
an Illinois divorce decree domesticated in Florida had been violated by the 
mother who was awarded custody); Crittendon v. Davis, 89 So. 3d 1098 (Fla. 
Dist. Ct. App. 2012) (reversing an order modifying a New Jersey judgment that 
awarded the father “legal custody,” which the appellate court found was the 
equivalent of sole parental responsibility under FLA. STAT. § 61.13(2)(c), (3) 
(2010), by awarding the parties shared parental responsibility and denying the 
father holiday timesharing, which the court referred to as “visitation”); Edgar 
v. Firuta, 100 So. 3d 255 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2012). 
204. In Maguire v. Wright, the parties were divorced in the United 
Kingdom in 2003 pursuant to a judgment that did not address child support or 
time-sharing issues.  The parties adopted an informal time-sharing schedule 
not submitted to any court for approval.  After both parties independently 
relocated to Florida, the mother domesticated the foreign judgment and filed a 
petition requesting the court to establish a parenting plan and award her 
“primary time-sharing” with the children.  The father requested equal time-
sharing, as well as additional relief.  After the father failed to return the 
parties’ youngest child following a trip to England, the mother sought 
“immediate return and custody” of the child.  The trial court’s order awarding 
the mother “immediate . . . physical custody,” was affirmed and the case was 
remanded for further proceedings on issues relating to parental responsibility 
and “temporary time-sharing.”  157 So. 3d 493, 495 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2015). 
205. Hahn v. Hahn, 42 So. 3d 945, 947 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2010) (finding 
that applying the post-2008 statute in a modification action of a pre-2008 
judgment would impermissibly impair mother’s rights as primary residential 
parent); see also Bachman v. McLinn, 65 So. 3d 71 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2011). 
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understanding is based on their perception of reality206 
influenced by results in their friends’ divorces, not on the 
theoretical underpinnings of the law. 
The skeptical reaction of practitioners in Florida to the 
nomenclature changes is not unique.  Similar observations 
followed the enactment of the Washington State Parenting Act, 
one of the first state statutes to modify nomenclature associated 
with custody actions and attempt to require parents to assume 
responsibilities following a divorce.207  In analyzing the effect 
statutory changes had following the adoption of the Washington 
State Parenting Act, one scholar noted a wide divergence in the 
perception of practitioners.  Those who embraced the new 
nomenclature perceived that elimination of the term “custody” 
had a positive impact on reducing animosity between parents, 
while others less inclined to use the new terminology insisted 
that there had been no change in client behavior.208  The 
reticence to embrace the changes is akin to employees who do 
not adopt modified value propositions by a corporation, making 
it difficult for the company to succeed in its rebranding efforts.209  
Without creating the appropriate perception in practitioners and 
judges that the new nomenclature and process provide an 
enhanced benefit for divorcing families, the rebranding of the 
process and post-divorce relationships between parents and 
their child is unlikely to succeed. 
One legal scholar, relying on surveys that indicate that only 
5% of single mothers reported that fathers had a “‘great deal’ of 
 
206. See supra note 274 and accompanying text. 
207. The public policy behind the act was expressed as follows: “Parents 
have the responsibility to make decisions and perform other parental functions 
necessary for the care and growth of their minor children.”  WASH. REV. CODE 
ANN. § 26.09.002 (West 2015).  In discussing a social experiment that required 
individuals to define the term “parent” when they were not advised what role 
they would assume in a new society that included children, Czapanskiy 
suggested the new definition would be: “a parent is the person who, by 
procreation, conduct or adoption, enters into two commitments: [f]irst, a 
commitment to a dependent human being to provide all the nurturance, 
whether financial or nonfinancial, of which the person is capable; and second, 
a commitment to deal respectfully and supportively with another person or 
persons who are in a parental relationship with the same child.”  Karen 
Czapanskiy, Volunteers and Drafters: The Struggle for Parental Equality, 38 
UCLA L. REV. 1415, 1464 (1991). 
208. Ellis, supra note 99, at 140-41, 178. 
209. See supra note 47 and accompanying text. 
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influence” over decisions concerning child-rearing and only 4% 
stated that the fathers provided “‘a great deal’ of help” raising 
the children, has questioned whether laws can positively 
influence parental behavior by requiring divorcing parents to 
work cooperatively to parent children.210  She does note, 
however, that where statutes presume an award of joint physical 
custody, more joint-parenting occurs and children perceive they 
have a better relationship with each parent.211  Joint physical 
custody typically is awarded where the parents tend to earn 
greater incomes, have higher levels of education, and are 
predisposed to co-parenting.212  With such small numbers of 
parents being involved in parenting subsequent to divorce, such 
laws, at best, will only impact a small number of parties, 
primarily those already inclined to maintain a positive 
relationship after separation.  Although many states permit 
joint custody arrangements, some states mandate, it and others 
now require the adoption of “parenting plans,” surveys indicate 
that cooperative co-parenting levels remain low.213  Practical 
considerations, such a work schedules, geographic proximity, 
time constraints and financial impact have an influence on the 
success of co-parenting attempts.214 
 
B. “Custody”215 Has Not Been Totally Eliminated in Florida216 
 
 
210. Marsha Garrison, Promoting Cooperative Parenting: Programs and 
Prospects, 9 J.L. & FAM. STUD. 265, 268 (2007). 
211. Id. at 269. 
212. Id. 
213. Id. at 270. 
214. Id. at 271. 
215. The continued use of the term “custody” in criminal or delinquency 
cases when referring to a minor child is beyond the scope of this article. 
216. The problem with inconsistent or conflicting provisions in Florida’s 
statutes dealing with children’s issues has been recognized in the past.  In 
1989, during a Special Session, the state legislature created the Commission 
on Child Welfare to study specific child-related statutes, although Chapter 61 
was not included in that list.  1990 Fla. Laws 12-13.  In 1999, the Florida Bar 
established the Commission on the Legal Needs of Children to study the legal 
needs of children appearing in all state court divisions.  Commission on the 
Legal Needs of Children, THE FLORIDA BAR, 
http://www.floridabar.org/tfb/TFBComm.nsf/840090c16eedaf0085256b610009
28dc/3ed599427239920385256ee70064e689!OpenDocument (last visited 
August 20, 2015). 
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The rebranding of custody litigation has not been successful 
because the former terminology, with its layperson’s 
understanding, continues to be used in the Florida Statutes.  
Absent consistent use of the new branding throughout statutes 
and the litigation process, it is difficult for the consumers, i.e. 
parents, to embrace the new terminology and value proposition.  
There is still meaning ascribed to being the custodial parent and 
certain rights and obligations, separate from those that may be 
designated in a parenting plan at the time of divorce, are 
dependent upon that designation and denied to those who lack 
it. 
Although the term “custody” has been eliminated from those 
statutes affecting disputes between parents for divorce actions 
originating in Florida, it is still well-entrenched in the Florida 
Statutes in connection with actions between parents and third 
parties, dependency proceedings, rights and obligations that 
flow from having “custody,” procedural matters, court and bar 
rules, and statutes implicated federal and uniform laws.  This 
would not be an issue if there was some distinction of what 
“custody” meant in those circumstances.  Although several 
statutes refer to “legal custody,”217 “actual custody,”218 or “actual 
physical custody,”219 in most instances the terms remain 
undefined.  Whether these nomenclature differences in the 
statutes have any significance is often difficult to determine.  
Applying strict statutory construction principles, the 
presumption is that the legislature did intend for the differences 
to be legally significant; 220 as a practical matter, however, 
absent a specific definition within the statute, it is likely the 
differences across chapters does not imply the language 
differences are legally significant. 
 
1.  “Custody” Remains in the Chapter 61 Divorce Statutes 
 
217. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 622.55 (2015); FLA. STAT. § 743.067 (2015); FLA. 
STAT. § 744.616 (2015); FLA. STAT. § 937.025 (2015). 
218. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 383.50 (2015); FLA. STAT. § 402.17 (2015); FLA. 
STAT. § 409.408 (2015); FLA. STAT. § 743.045 (2015); FLA. STAT. § 743.046 (2015); 
FLA. STAT. § 768.19 (2015). 
219. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 39.01 (2015); FLA. STAT. § 1003.20 (2015); FLA. 
STAT. § 1012.22 (2015); FLA. STAT. § 937.025 (2015). 
220. See Atlantis at Perdido Ass’n v. Warner, 932 So. 2d 1206, 1213 (Fla. 
Dist. Ct. App. 2006). 
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Although “custody” was eliminated in connection with child 
placement issues arising in a divorce action, it still remains in 
Chapter 61.  The term can be found in sections addressing 
jurisdiction issues,221 safeguards for the return of a child after 
the exercise of time-sharing,222 temporary modifications 
resulting from military service, 223 and electronic communication 
between a parent and a child. 224  In each of these statutes, rights 
and obligations are assigned to the person who has “custody” of 
the child or is entitled to “visitation.” 
 
2.  Parents Cannot Have “Custody” of Their Child, but 
Others Can 
 
Although no parent in a divorce action filed after the 
effective date of the 2008 amendments will be entitled to claim 
“custody” of a child born to the parties,225 non-parent third 
 
221. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. §§ 751.02 & 61.501 et seq. (2015). 
222. When there is sufficient risk that a parent may remove a child from 
the state or the country after the adoption of a parenting plan and time-sharing 
schedule, the court may enter an order, prohibiting the parent from “removing 
or retaining the child in violation of a child custody determination.”  FLA. STAT. 
§ 61.45(3)(b)(2) (2015).  The statute also permits the court to condition travel 
outside the country upon a requirement that the party planning to travel with 
the child obtain an order from the “foreign country containing terms identical 
to the child custody determination issued in this country.”  FLA. STAT. § 61.45(7) 
(2015).  Unlike FLA. STAT. § 61.13 where “parents” was substituted for 
“parties,” FLA. STAT. § 61.45 continues to refer to the litigants in proceedings 
involving parenting plans and time-sharing as the “parties.”  Id. 
223. Where a parent’s military service requires special consideration of 
the time-sharing schedule, parents are required to mutually exchange 
information and cooperate in resolving issues relating to “custody, visitation, 
[and] delegation of visitation[.]”  FLA. STAT. § 61.13002(3) (2015).  In addition, 
during a dissolution of marriage or “child custody” proceeding, courts can 
delegate time-sharing privileges to a third-party when it is anticipated that 
military service will interfere with the parent’s ability to exercise time-sharing.  
, 
224. Without proving that there has been a substantial change in 
circumstances, required to modify a court order establishing a parenting plan 
or time-sharing schedule, a “party to a child custody order” may seek an order 
providing for electronic communication with the child if there is no prohibition 
on such communication.  FLA. STAT. § 61.13003(5) (2015). 
225. This may raise constitutional equal protection claims, the 
consideration of which are beyond the scope of this article. 
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parties may still be awarded “custody” of that child.226  In 
addition, temporary “custody” may be awarded to extended 
family members, 227 “custody” is assigned in child dependency 
actions to protect a child’s health, safety and welfare, 228 and 
“custody” is awarded in adoption cases. 229 
 
226. “The term “custody” was retained in Chapter 61 when used in the 
context of awarding custody to a non-parent. See FLA. STAT. § 751.01 et seq. 
(2013).”  LiFleur v. Webster, 138 So. 3d 570, 576 n.1 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2014). 
227. An extended family member may be awarded temporary custody of a 
child with the consent of the parents or if the family member is acting as a 
substitute parent caring for the child on a full-time basis.  FLA. STAT. § 
751.02(1) (2015); see, e.g., Seigler v. Bell, 148 So. 3d 473 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 
2014); D.M.M. v. J.M.M., 63 So. 3d 910 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2011).  As an 
alternative, an extended family member that has had “physical custody” of the 
child for a specified period of time, although not currently caring for the child 
on a full-time basis, can be awarded concurrent custody.  FLA. STAT. § 751.02(2) 
(2015).  If there is no objection from the parents to the award of custody to the 
extended family member, the court applies the same standard used to establish 
a parenting plan and time-sharing schedule for parents to award temporary or 
concurrent custody – the best interests of the child.  FLA. STAT. § 751.05(2) 
(2015).  If either parent does object, then the court cannot award concurrent 
custody and must use a more stringent standard and find that there is clear 
and convincing evidence that the child has been abused, abandoned, or 
neglected as defined under FLA. STAT. Chapter 39 before making an award of 
temporary custody.  FLA. STAT. § 751.05(3) (2015).  In those situations where 
the court awards concurrent custody, then such award “may not eliminate or 
diminish the custodial rights of the child’s parent or parents” and either or 
both parents may obtain physical custody of the child.  FLA. STAT. § 751.05(4) 
(2015). 
228. When a child is taken into state care to protect the child’s health, 
safety, and welfare, the state agency responsible for the care is deemed to have 
removed the child from “parental custody.”  See generally FLA. STAT. § 39.001, 
et seq. (2015); see also FLA. STAT. § 39.001(1)(f) (2015).  In addressing 
permanency goals for a child that had been removed, if reunification is not 
possible and parental rights are terminated, alternatives if adoption does not 
occur with one year include “custody” to a relative or to a foster parent on a 
permanent basis.  FLA. STAT. § 39.001(1)(j) (2015).  In addition, under the 
statute, to determine who has certain obligations to the child and due process 
rights, the state looks to the person with “legal custody,” which is defined as “a 
legal status created by a court which vests in a custodian of the person or 
guardian . . . the right to have physical custody of the child” as well as other 
defined rights and duties.  FLA. STAT. § 39.01(34) (2015). 
229. Adoptive parents receive custodial rights to a child and have a 
constitutionally protected interest in retaining such rights.  FLA. STAT. § 
63.022(1)(d) (2015).  Adoption considerations are governed by the best interests 
of the child.  FLA. STAT. § 63.022(2) (2015).  Similarly, those requiring to consent 
to the adoption include anyone who may claim to have rights to “custody” or 
have “physical custody” or “lawful custody.”  FLA. STAT. § 63.062 (2015); see also 
FLA. STAT. § 63.082 (2015) (providing for execution or revocation of consent by 
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3.  Rights and Obligations Are Reserved for the Parent Who 
Has “Custody” 
 
Under Florida law, the parents, jointly, are the natural 
guardians for a child.230  Prior to July 1, 2012, if the parents 
divorced, the natural guardianship was vested in the parent 
awarded custody; if joint custody was ordered, then both parents 
continued to share natural guardianship.231  Despite changes to 
Chapter 61 eliminating the designation of a custodial parent in 
2008, it was not until 2012 that statutory amendments were 
adopted revising the natural guardianship language to provide 
that divorced parents with shared parental responsibility 
continue as joint natural guardians; if one parent has been 
awarded sole parental responsibility, that parent becomes the 
natural guardian.232  Although the 2012 amendments struck 
references to “custody” when dealing with divorcing parents, it 
left intact the custodial parent designation for the mother of a 
child born out of wedlock who is deemed the natural guardian of 
the child and is entitled to “primary residential care and custody 
of the child,” absent court order to the contrary.233 
Certain rights and obligations are reserved for those 
designated as the “custodial parent,” including the right to name 
the child, 234 the allocation of health insurance benefits on behalf 
of the child,235 the obligation to present the child for paternity 
 
the person having “custody” of the child). 
230. FLA. STAT. § 744.301(1) (2015). 
231. 2012 Fla. Laws 654. 
232. Id.; FLA. STAT. § 744.301(1) (2012). 
233. FLA. STAT. § 744.301(1) 2012. 
234. The right to designate the given name and surname of the child is 
reserved to the mother and father who are listed on the birth certificate, when 
the mother is married, or both parents have “custody” of the child, or the parent 
who has “custody” if it is not jointly held by the parents; or whoever will have 
custody of the child, if the mother was unmarried when the child was born.  
FLA. STAT. § 382.013(3)(a)-(c) (2015). 
235. The allocation of health insurance benefits for a child covered under 
two or more policies when the child’s parents are divorced is based upon which 
parent has “custody” of the child, with that parent’s policy providing coverage 
first, that parent’s current spouse’s policy providing coverage next, and the 
non-custodial parent’s policy being considered last.  FLA. STAT. § 627.4235(4)(c) 
(2015); FLA. STAT. § 627.6415(4) (2015).  No changes have been made to the 
statutes since the 2008 amendments to Chapter 61. 
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testing, 236 the right to obtain medical treatment for the child, 237 
and the ability to enroll a child in a school readiness program. 238  
  
 
4.  “Custody” is Still Relevant in Procedural Matters 
 
Aside from issues relating to statutes that use the terms 
“custody” or “visitation,” Florida’s procedural and bar rules 
continue to use the term in connection with offering legal 
services to military personnel, 239 informational filing when an 
action is initiated, 240 the use of alternative dispute resolution 
methods to resolve custody disputes, 241 the offer of settlement 
rule, 242 and the obligation to appear for jury duty. 243 
 
236. In administrative proceedings to establish paternity for purposes of 
collecting child support, the mother or putative father who has “custody” of the 
minor child must present the child for genetic testing as scheduled by the 
state’s Department of Revenue.  FLA. STAT. § 409.256(6)(a) (2015). 
237. An individual who is an “unaccompanied homeless youth,” 
unmarried, and the parent of a child with “actual custody” of the child can 
consent to medical treatment of the child.  FLA. STAT. § 743.067(3)(b)(2) (2015). 
238. Children eligible for benefits under the School Readiness Program 
include those who are in the “custody” of a homeless parent or a parent who is 
the victim of domestic violence and is residing in a domestic violence center.  
FLA. STAT. § 1002.81(1)(e) & (f) (2015). 
239. In order to expand the availability of legal services to military 
personnel in the state, military personnel licensed to practice in another state 
are permitted to practice before Florida courts to provide representation in 
domestic relations matters that include “child custody” actions.  FLA. BAR REG. 
R. 18-1.4(C)(3) (2015). 
240. For case management purposes, petitioners must file a notice of 
related cases in family cases, which include matters related to “custodial care 
and access to children.”  FLA. R. JUD. ADMIN. 2.545. 
241. Disputes relating to “child custody” or “visitation” cannot be resolved 
through voluntary binding arbitration or voluntary trial resolution.  FLA. STAT. 
§ 44.104(14) (2015).  This was further emphasized in 2013, years after the 
effective date of the 2008 amendments, when a new section was added to the 
state arbitration code providing that the code does not apply to matters 
relating to “child custody” or “visitation.”  FLA. STAT. § 682.25 (2015).  See also 
FLA. STAT. § 682.014(3)(k) (2015) (providing that parties cannot waive the 
exclusion from arbitration of disputes involving child custody or visitation).  
Although arbitration is not an available dispute resolution mechanism, family 
mediation can be used to resolve matters concerning “child custody” or 
“visitation.”  FLA. STAT. § 44.1011(2)(d) (2015). 
242. The offer of settlement rule does not apply to matters relating to 
“child custody.”  FLA. STAT. § 45.061 (2015). 
243. Individuals who have “custody” of a child can also be excused from 
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5.  Designation of Custodial Parent Referenced in Uniform 
Law, Federal Statutes, and International Conventions 
 
Because most other states and countries continue to use 
“custody” and “visitation” in their statutes, those references are 
prevalent in uniform laws, federal statutes, and international 
treaties and conventions.  Florida has adopted a number of 
uniform laws relating to children that ascribe rights and 
responsibilities to parents.  These statutes refer to “custody,” 
“visitation,” “custodial parent,” or some variation.  In order to 
invoke the relief available under these statutes, some 
designation or understanding of who is the custodial parent is 
typically required.  Some of these statutes include the Uniform 
Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act,244 the 
Interstate Compact on the Placement of Children,245 the 
Uniform Interstate Family Support Act,246 and compliance with 
the Federal Parent Locator Service.247 
 
jury duty; those with “custody” who provide care at home for a child under the 
age of ten can be relieved of federal petit and grand jury duty, M.D. FLA. JURY 
PLAN 7.05(a)(2), while a parent who is not employed full-time and has “custody” 
of a child under the age of six can be excused from serving on a state jury.  FLA. 
STAT. § 40.013(4) (2015). 
244. The Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act 
(UCCJEA), amended in 2002, controls jurisdiction in matters relating to “child 
custody” and “visitation” proceedings.  FLA. STAT. § 61.501, et seq. (2015).  No 
amendments have been made to the UCCJEA since its original adoption. Id.  
The 2008 amendments require that all jurisdictional issues under the 
UCCJEA must be addressed in the parenting plan and provides that a 
parenting plan incorporated in a judgment or order is a custody determination 
for purposes of the act.  FLA. STAT. § 61.046(13)(a)-(b) (2008). 
245. The Interstate Compact on the Placement of Children, adopted in 
2009, includes definitions of a “non-custodial parent” and references “custody” 
throughout the statute.  FLA. STAT. § 409.401, et seq. (2015).  No amendments 
to revise references to the “custody” or “visitation” have been made since its 
original adoption. 
246. The Uniform Interstate Family Support Act (UIFSA) was originally 
adopted in 1996.  Despite amendments in 2011, which became effective in 
2014, the act still provides that exercise of the remedies for support 
enforcement available under the act does not give a court jurisdiction to issue 
orders relating to “child custody or visitation.”  FLA. STAT. § 88.1031(2)(b) 
(2015). 
247. In actions brought to release information pursuant to the Federal 
Parent Locator Service, notwithstanding family violence indicators, location 
disclosure is permitted to state agents or attorneys and judges who can bring 
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There are also a number of federal statutes that reference 
rights and obligations imposed upon custodial and non-custodial 
parents, including the Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act,248 
the Servicemembers Civil Relief Act,249 the Indian Child Welfare 
Act,250 Veterans’ benefits for dependents, 251 and the Internal 
Revenue Code.252  “Custody” also continues to be used in 
international treaties and conventions, most notably the Hague 
Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child 
 
or hear actions to “enforce a child custody or visitation determination or order 
establishing a parenting plan.”  FLA. FAM. L.R.P. 12.650(b)(1) & (2).  The 
Committee Note to the rule explains that the 2008 amendments: 
 
[E]liminated such terms as ‘custodial parent,’ ‘noncustodial 
parent,’ and ‘visitation’ from Chapter 61, Florida Statutes.  
Instead, the court adopts or establishes a parenting plan that 
includes, among other things, a time-sharing schedule for the 
minor children.  These statutory changes are reflected in the 
amendments to the definitions in this rule.  However, 
because 42 U.S.C. § 653 includes the terms ‘custody’ and 
‘visitation,’ these terms have not been excised from the 
remainder of the rule. 
 
Id. 
248. The Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act (PKPA) refers exclusively 
to custody and visitation.  See 28 U.S.C. § 1738A (2012); 42 U.S.C. § 633 (2012).  
The 2008 amendments require that the parenting plan agreed to by the parties 
or adopted by the court must address jurisdictional issues under the PKPA. 
FLA. STAT. § 61.046(13)(a) (2008). 
249. Under the Servicemembers Civil Relief Act, there are certain 
restrictions on a court’s power to act in custody actions involving a 
servicemember who is being deployed. See 50 U.S.C. § 3938 (2012). 
250. The Indian Child Welfare Act addresses the policy that Indian 
children removed from their families should be placed in the custody of 
individuals that will support and promote values inherent in the Indian 
culture. 25 U.S.C. § 1902, et seq. (2012). 
251. Life insurance coverage and benefits available to children of veterans 
are dependent upon which parent has “legal custody” of the child.  38 U.S.C. § 
1967(a)(4)(B) (2012). 
252. Under the Internal Revenue Code, the entitlement to claim a 
personal exemption of a child on federal tax returns following the parents’ 
divorce hinges on which parent has “custody,” and whether that parent has 
executed the appropriate forms to allow the “noncustodial” to claim the 
dependent child.  I.R.C. §§ 151(c)-152(e)(1)-(2) (2012).  The “custodial parent” 
is “the parent having custody for the greater portion of the calendar year,” 
while the “noncustodial parent” is “the parent who is not the custodial parent.”  
I.R.C. § 152(e)(4)(A)-(B) (2012). 
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Abduction.253  For example, the International Child Abduction 
Remedies Act (ICARA),254 implementing the Hague Convention, 
refers to “custody” and “visitation.”255 
 
VI. “Custody” Rebranding Implications and Suggestions for 
Implementation 
 
An examination of Florida’s experience in rebranding 
“custody” litigation suggests that such efforts have not been 
wholly successful.  The new “custody” brand, characterized by 
revised nomenclature, including “parenting plans” and 
“parenting time,” has a commendable value proposition to 
reduce animosity between parents throughout the divorce 
process and as they co-parent after divorce.  This is a worthy 
goal based on research indicating that children in families who 
continue to experience a high level of conflict after divorce fare 
poorly in terms of health, behavior, and educational 
achievement.256  On the other hand, children who experiences 
cooperative co-parenting enjoy a higher level of contact with 
each parent and more positive relationships.257 
The new standards developed to reduce the animosity 
associated with custody litigation fundamentally alter custody 
dispute resolution by requiring parents to assume the primary 
 
253. Hague Conven. on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction 
(1980) T.I.A.S. No. 11670; 1343 U.N.T.S. 89. 
254. 22 U.S.C. § 9001 (2012). 
255. ICARA defines “rights of access” under the Convention as “visitation 
rights.”  22 U.S.C. § 9002(7) (2012).  The act also defines “rights of custody” 
maintained by “an individual or legal custodian” as “rights of care and custody 
of a child, including the right to determine the place of residence of a child, 
under the laws of the country in which the child is a habitual resident” that 
are awarded through “operation of law,” court order, or the parties’ agreement.  
22 U.S.C. § 9101(21) (2012).  In addition, relief under the act after a child has 
been wrongfully removed to another country is invoked by the “left-behind 
parent,” who is “an individual or legal custodian who alleges that an abduction 
has occurred that is in breach of rights of custody attributed to such 
individual.” 22 U.S.C. § 9101(15) (2012).  In order to allow for invocation of the 
relief afforded under the Hague Convention, the definitions adopted at the time 
of the 2008 amendments provide that “custody” rights under the convention 
are determined by the parenting plan agreed to by the parties or adopted by 
the court.  FLA. STAT. § 61.046(13)(c) (2008). 
256. Garrison, supra note 210 at 265. 
257. Id. at 267-68. 
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responsibility for resolving their disputes through the creation 
of a parenting plan.258  These revised standards and the modified 
verbiage replacing “custody” and “visitation” are the equivalent 
of a company’s new value proposition.259  The brand promise 
being offered by the “sellers” (the state legislators, judges, and 
lawyers) is that the “consumers” (parents and their children) 
will experience a less contentious divorce and post-divorce, co-
parenting relationship if the new standards are implemented. 
The import of changes in terminology, however, are often 
lost by parents.  Terms associated with child custody 
determinations have been repeatedly modified and include: 
custody, visitation, parental responsibility, shared parenting, 
legal custody, physical custody, primary residence, primary 
residential parent, secondary residential parent, non-residential 
parent, and the list goes on.  These terms themselves are often 
ill-defined.260  As new terminology has been adopted by state 
legislatures, those “selling” custody determinations—lawyers 
and judges—have adapted better than parents,261 the ultimate 
“consumers” who must abide by the decisions.  Parents continue 
to speak in terms of “custody” and “visitation,” regardless of the 
nomenclature du jour.262  In addition, there is at least anecdotal 
evidence that use of the new terminology requiring the 
development of parenting plans has the opposite of the intended 
effect, increasing acrimony between parents forced to resolve 
detailed minutiae relating to parenting decisions.263 
Those responsible for child custody reform have done a poor 
job educating the public about the benefits to be gained by not 
 
258. Singer, supra note 81, at 184.  Singer argues that the adoption of 
parenting plan requirements has shifted the focus of custody litigation from 
“allocating custodial rights and obligations” to “‘planning’ for children’s future 
needs.”  Id. at 186-87.  See also Elizabeth S. Scott, Planning for Children and 
Resolving Custodial Disputes: A Comment on the Think Tank Report, 52 FAM. 
CT. REV. 200, 200 (2014) (praising the Association of Family and Conciliation 
Courts’ Think Tank on Research, Policy, Practice, and Shared Parenting for 
maintaining that family decisions should be made by parents, not the courts). 
259. See GRONLUND, supra note 33. 
260. See supra note 76 and accompanying text. 
261. See supra note 176 and accompanying text. 
262. See supra note 181 and accompanying text. 
263. Jane W. Ellis, Book Review, 22 N.Y.U. REV. L & SOC. CHANGE 253, 
261 (1996) (reviewing CARLA B. GARRITY & MITCHELL A. BARIS, CAUGHT IN THE 
MIDDLE: PROTECTING THE CHILDREN OF HIGH CONFLICT DIVORCE (1994)). 
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thinking in terms of “custody” and “visitation,” and “winning” 
and “losing” custody, after a divorce.264  There has been no 
attempt to rebrand “custody” that would allow consumers to 
form a favorable impression of terms such as “parenting plans” 
and “parenting time” because, in most instances, the first time 
parents are exposed to such concepts is when they are in the 
divorce lawyer’s office, a time when they are often in a highly 
agitated emotional state.  While the promise of an amicable 
divorce may be appealing, parents’ perception of “custody” has 
been ingrained through, literally, hundreds of years of 
conditioning that “losing custody” implies the existence of 
negative character traits that led to such a result.265  In many 
instances, those in the process of divorcing now were the 
children of divorce in the 1970s and later years, when having a 
primary caretaking parent, typically the mother, was the 
norm.266  Having personally lived through that experience, it is 
not surprising that adaptation to new standards and 
terminology is slow to occur when what is demanded is a 
fundamental change in culture.267  Changing the nomenclature 
may cause some parents to “feel better” about their continued 
status as parents after divorce, but underlying emotional 
responses to custody disputes still remain.268  Despite the demise 
 
264. Parenting education classes, required in some jurisdictions, address 
the impact divorce has on children and encourage less adversarial conflict 
resolution.  Singer, supra note 81, at 188.  A four-hour class, however, cannot 
be expected to undo deeply-ingrained beliefs about custody, visitation, and 
parental rights.  Given the claim that 35% of parents have chronically 
conflicted co-parenting styles, the efficacy of these classes is questionable.  See 
Sullivan, supra note 96, at 19. 
265. See Barbara Bennett Woodhouse, Child Custody in the Age of 
Children’s Rights: The Search for a Just and Workable Standard, 33 FAM. L.Q. 
815, 816 (1999) (suggesting that concepts of “custody” were traditionally based 
on social status hierarchy with possessory interest being vested in the family 
patriarch). 
266. Warshak, supra note 78, at 92-93. 
267. See generally J. Herbie DiFonzo, From the Rule of One to Shared 
Parenting: Custody Presumptions in Law and Policy, 52 FAM. CT. REV. 213, 225-
26 (2014). 
268. Mabry, supra note 92, at 242.  See also GITLIN ON DIVORCE: A GUIDE 
TO ILLINOIS MATRIMONIAL LAW § 1.4 (LexisNexis 2012) (suggesting that 
nomenclature changes in the Illinois Marriage and Dissolution of Marriage Act 
are “cosmetic” and “do not in any way eliminate the acrimony from 
matrimonial law proceedings . . . . The acrimonious nature of most matrimonial 
law proceedings should be recognized as a reality that will not change.”). 
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of the “tender years” doctrine and legislative shifts to shared 
parenting standards, popular culture still often views the 
mother as the person who should, and typically does, receive 
custody of a minor child.269 
During the emotional upheaval of a divorce, parents’ 
conduct is susceptible to influences from third parties, including 
their lawyers.  Their expectations of outcomes are colored by 
lawyers’ representations and generally are much higher at the 
outset of the case and ebb towards settlements reached through 
compromise as the case progresses.270  In many instances, the 
lawyers responsible for managing client expectations have 
themselves not adapted to the new terminology mandated by 
statutory changes.271 
The rebranding of custody litigation is also hampered by the 
slow adoption of nomenclature changes by the courts and 
practitioners because the substantive import of the changes is 
not always clear272 and there is a lack of consistency in 
terminology across statutory provisions affecting children.273  In 
addition, there is little evidence that these changes have any 
significant impact on the  decisions ultimately rendered by 
courts or through settlements.274  In fact, some experts posit that 
 
269. The lyrics in I’m So Happy I Can’t Stop Crying, a song penned by 
Sting and recorded as a duet with Toby Keith in 1997, state: 
 
Saw my lawyer, Mr Good News 
He got me joint custody and legal separation 
*   *   * 
The park is full of Sunday fathers and melted ice cream 
We try to do the best within the given time 
A kid should be with his mother 
Everybody knows that  
What can a father do but baby-sit sometimes??” 
 
STING, I’m So Happy I Can’t Stop Crying, on DREAM WALKIN’ (Mercury 1997).  
Similarly, the 2008 Zac Brown Band song, Highway 20 Ride, written by Wyatt 
Durrette and lead singer, Zachary Brown, describes a divorced father driving 
on the highway every other Friday to visit his son in a different state. 
270. Gary Skoloff & Robert J. Levy, Custody Doctrines and Custody 
Practice: A Divorce Practitioner’s View, 36 FAM. L.Q. 79, 81-82 (2002). 
271. Christensen, supra note 181, at 4. 
272. See supra notes 170-73 and accompanying text. 
273. See discussion supra Section V.B. 
274. Skoloff & Levy, supra note 270, at 84-85; Robert Mnookin, Child 
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settlement terms are often not grounded on the legal principles 
contained in statutes governing custody cases.275  Consequently, 
the statutory principles and nomenclature may have little 
bearing on strategies employed by practitioners and parents’ 
assessment of the ultimate goals to be achieved. 
Rebranding is necessary if changes in custody standards are 
to be successful because clients and their lawyers do not speak 
the same language and do not share similar motivations. 
 
Clients bring to their interactions with lawyers   . 
. . a ‘natural attitude’ or an ‘attitude of everyday 
life.’  In this attitude the way the world appears is 
accepted as the way the world really is. The self is 
perceived to be at the center of society and events 
are interpreted in terms of their impact on the 
self. Lawyers, on the other hand, might be 
expected to think of motives and actions in . . . 
‘rational-purposive’ terms in which technical rules 
and a problem-solving orientation are more 
important than emotional reactions and 
justifications of self.276 
 
This disconnect is fueled throughout the professional 
relationship as lawyers focus on the legal aspects of the divorce 
governed by rules and statutes, a language that is foreign to 
clients, and clients focus on the emotional and social impact of 
divorce, facets that are meaningless to the lawyer.277  The shift 
in attitude, then, is where the rebranding of custody must focus. 
Achieving the goal of reducing the number of custody cases 
 
Custody Revisited, 77 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 249, 263 (2014). 
275. See Marc Galanter & Mia Cahill, “Most Cases Settle”: Judicial 
Promotion and Regulation of Settlements, 46 STAN. L. REV. 1339, 1352 (1994); 
Robert H. Mnookin & Lewis Kornhausert,  Bargaining in the Shadow of the 
Law: The Case of Divorce, 88 YALE L.J. 950, 950 (1979); Skoloff & Levy, supra 
note 271, at 89-90 (discussing views that lawyers who act as “counselors” in 
divorce cases promote compromise, while “advocates” strive for the most 
favorable outcome). 
276. Austin Sarat & William L. F. Felstiner, Law and Social Relations: 
Vocabularies of Motive in Lawyer/Client Interaction, 22 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 737, 
739-40 (1988). 
277. Id. at 764. 
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that are litigated and decreasing the level of animosity in those 
cases has been elusive.  This is a cautionary tale for those states 
contemplating changes in nomenclature, including eliminating 
the recognized “custody” brand, to consider some of the 
challenges faced in Florida.  When the new nomenclature and 
parenting plan design were introduced, there were no efforts to 
modify parental social behavior to embrace the new terminology 
and the new paradigm for resolving custody disputes through 
rebranding.  Successful corporate rebranding typically involves 
extensive market analysis as symbols of the new brand and the 
value proposition itself are developed and test-marketed.278  The 
modifications to the “custody” brand did not undergo any such 
testing.  Although legislators, jurists, practitioners, and mental 
health professionals were involved in the process as statutory 
amendments were proposed,279 the ultimate consumers, the 
parents affected by the new legislation, generally were not 
consulted.  Instead, the new paradigm was foisted upon them 
with little attention being given to the need to introduce the new 
concepts and develop strategies to gain the favorable public 
impression needed for a successful rebranding.  As a result, 
parents continue to use the terms “custody” and “visitation,” 
while practitioners and judges give at least an attempt to utilize 
the new terminology, although not convinced that it has any 
effect on the course of litigation or the ultimate outcomes 
achieved.280  In short, there was no attempt to develop a new 
“attitude” consistent with the new brand.281 
For those states contemplating a new brand that eschews 
“custody” and “visitation,” implementing the following four 
proposals could make the rebranding goal attainable and 
provide for an acceptance of the new value proposition as one 
that provides significant benefits for a family following a divorce: 
1) create a marketing campaign that explains the benefits under 
the new paradigm; 2)  allow for a period of transition as parents 
acclimate to the new nomenclature and co-parenting 
 
278. Jim Makos, SWOT Analysis to Help with Branding and Marketing, 
PESTLEANALYSIS (Mar. 6, 2015), http://pestleanalysis.com/swot-analysis-in-
branding-marketing/. 
279. Roy, supra note 187. 
280. See supra note 190; see also notes 174-176 and accompanying text. 
281. See note 65 and accompanying text. 
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expectations; 3) use the new nomenclature consistently 
throughout state statutes; and 4) invest in developing “buy-in” 
from stakeholders, primarily lawyers and judges, early in the 
process. 
 
A. Marketing Campaign 
 
Despite the revisions to the Florida Statutes adopting 
“parenting plans” and “time-sharing,” pro se litigants continue 
to use the words “custody” and “visitation” in their court 
filings.282  These are terms familiar to parents and ones used 
throughout history.  The general public is unaware of the shifts 
in nomenclature and standards used in custody determinations, 
although litigants are exposed to the different terminology when 
they retain counsel and attend parenting classes required in 
many states afford opportunities to introduce the new 
concepts.283  By then, however, social behavior and perceptions 
of what is involved in divorce and custody litigation have already 
been ingrained through the priming process discussed by Calder 
when explaining behavior reactions to branding.284  Expecting 
these social norms to change during the divorce process when 
emotions run high is unrealistic. 
As seen in the ineffective rebranding of JC Penney, changes 
in the value proposition that exceed the understanding of the 
public are unlikely to gain acceptance.285  In that situation, 
education of the consumer was required before the new pricing 
strategy could have been successful.  Similarly, if rebranding of 
custody litigation is to succeed, parents must be afforded an 
opportunity to develop familiarity with the new terms and the 
import of the process of custody determinations before the new 
value proposition can be expected to receive favorable 
acceptance. 
To effectuate change, then, there must be a cultural shift 
 
282. See supra note 181 and accompanying text.  This is similar to the 
continued use of “divorce,” although the terminology was changed to 
“dissolution of marriage” in 1971.  See supra note 142. 
283. See Francis J. Catania, Learning from the Process of Decision: The 
Parenting Plan, 2001 BYU L. REV. 857, 884 n.167 (2001). 
284. Goldenberg, supra note 133. 
285. See supra notes 53-57 and accompanying text. 
58http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol36/iss2/2
  
2016 CHILD “CUSTODY” LITIGATION 433 
that occurs before parents are in the process of divorcing and 
resolving issues relating to shared parenting.  Just as public 
health officials now use marketing campaigns to effectuate 
change in social behavior, exposing the general public to changes 
in co-parenting expectations post-divorce can be a viable vehicle 
for change.  Public health announcements targeting smokers 
have proven to be effective, although directed at a much smaller 
audience286 than the approximately 36% of married adults who 
will eventually divorce.287  Managing expectations before 
parents enter the divorce process can ease the rebranding 
procedure. 
Although most divorces cases settle without judicial 
intervention, as noted earlier, a small percentage of divorcing 
couples engage in high-conflict litigation, especially over issues 
affecting custody of a minor child.288  A small percentage of this 
group continue in their acrimonious conduct, to the detriment of 
their children, long after the divorce decree has been entered, 
but others do settle into a relative state of calm within a few 
years after the divorce.289  Perhaps it is this latter group that can 
be targeted and will benefit the most from social behavior 
marketing.  The truly highly conflicted parents will be unlikely 
to respond, just as some consumers will never form a positive 
image of a product, no matter how successful the branding 
campaign may otherwise be.290 
 
B. Transition Period 
 
Consideration needs to be given to the transition in both 
nomenclature and custody standards to allow parents the 
 
286. In 2013, 17.8% of U.S. adults reportedly smoked.  Bahar Gholipour, 
Smoking US Declines to All-Time Low, LIVESCIENCE (Nov. 26, 2014), 
http://www.livescience.com/48923-usa-smoking-declines-to-lowest.html. 
287. According to the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, the 
average United States divorce rate for the forty-four states and the District of 
Columbia that reported data is 36%.  FastStats Marriage and Divorce, CTRS. 
FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, 
http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/fastats/marriage-divorce.htm (last updated June 19, 
2014). 
288. See supra notes 23-24 and accompanying text. 
289. See supra notes 23-24 and accompanying text. 
290. Calder, supra note 58 at 12. 
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opportunity to recognize the benefits afforded by the new value 
proposition.  In Florida, the change from a parent’s right to be 
designated the “primary residential parent” to instead having 
“time-sharing” with a child occurred overnight.  For actions filed 
on September 30, 2008 the prior statute using the familiar 
vernacular of “custody,” “visitation,” and “primary residential 
parent” governed, regardless of when the case was resolved 
through settlement or judicial decree; for those who filed their 
action the following day, October 1, 2008, an entirely new 
scheme involving parenting plans and a time-sharing schedule 
was required.291  Explaining the difference in rights and 
obligations in a fundamental relationship like that of parent-
child caused by the difference of one day placed practitioners in 
a difficult position.  These problems may have been further 
exacerbated and will continue into the future because those who 
were divorced under the old regime still have the prior statute 
applied in modification and enforcement cases; these cases 
continue to use “custody,” and “visitation,” although some courts 
toss in the new terms for extra measure.292  This dichotomy can 
conceivably continue until 2026, when infants born in 2008 
whose parents filed for divorce before October 1 of that year will 
finally turn eighteen and the court will lose jurisdiction over 
their parenting issues.293 
Although the enforcement and modification of pre-2008 
amendment cases in Florida justify using the former 
terminology under the theory that rights once granted should 
not be removed by subsequent litigation, that argument should 
be discounted.  Its effect is to create a class of persons with 
“custodial” rights that are denied to another class of persons as 
a result of an arbitrary effective date selected by the legislature. 
Given that parenting is a fundamental right under the U.S. 
Constitution,294 there should be no divergence in parental rights.  
 
291. See supra notes 173-75 and accompanying text. 
292. See supra notes 200-01 and accompanying text. 
293. The age of majority in Florida is eighteen.  FLA. STAT. § 743.07(1) 
(2015).  Actions could still continue for another year, however, because the child 
support obligation can continue beyond the child’s eighteenth birthday if the 
child is still enrolled in high school with an expectation of graduating by the 
child’s nineteenth birthday.  FLA. STAT. § 743.07(2) (2015). 
294. See, e.g., Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923); Pierce v. Soc’y of 
Sisters of the Holy Names of Jesus and Mary, 268 U.S. 510 (1925). 
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For actions that come before the court for enforcement, and 
especially for modification subsequent to the enactment of 
statutes rebranding custody litigation, consideration should be 
given to requiring compliance with the new statutory provisions.  
In addition, rather than requiring the mandates of the statute 
to have prospective application to actions filed subsequent to the 
effective date of the modification, consideration should be given 
to make the revisions control all cases resolved subsequent to 
the effective date.  If the goal is the reduction of litigation and 
post-decretal animosity, then the purported benefits of the 
statutory revisions should not be denied to those who filed for 
divorce prior to the statute’s enactment.  This method of 
application will, to some extent, avoid the cliff effect that a filing 
date demarcation has, ease the transition to the new 
nomenclature, and ensure that all cases heard subsequent to the 
effective date apply the same standard, reducing confusion for 
parents, lawyers, and judges. 
 
C. Consistency 
 
Florida’s statutes provide a good example of the problems of 
lack of consistency in branding for the public to understand the 
brand.295  The statutes are replete with references to “custody” 
as a right afforded to parents in certain circumstances and to 
third parties in other.  The term “custody” carries with it legal 
significance because it provides to the designee rights to indicia 
of parenthood, such as naming a child and providing medical 
care.296  When the custodial parent is the one responsible for 
providing medical insurance, but neither parent is named the 
custodial parent, confusion and the likelihood of future litigation 
can be increased rather than lessened.  At best, the words 
themselves can be rendered meaningless if they are viewed 
simply as nomenclature changes and not a shift in the value 
proposition.297  In addition, under uniform, federal, and 
 
295. See supra note 37 and accompanying text (discussing the importance 
of consistency in branding). 
296. See discussion supra Section V.B.3. 
297. See supra note 190.  Although the primary residential parent 
designation was eliminated, judges now refer to one parent having majority 
time-sharing.  See, e.g., Mayo v. Mayo, 87 So. 3d 820, 821 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 
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international laws, certain rights are reserved for the “custodial” 
parent.  Introducing foreign terms such as “parenting plan” and 
“time-sharing,” while prohibiting an award of custody, creates 
confusion and a justifiable concern that parental rights are being 
lost, despite the adoption of statutes to allow for implementation 
of relief afforded under those laws referring to “custody.” 
 
D. Stakeholder Buy-In 
 
Marketing experts recommend bringing employees into the 
rebranding process early so their support for changes in the 
value proposition can be developed making them its ardent 
spokespersons.298  The weak acceptance of nomenclature 
changes and shifts in the custody standards in Florida is not 
atypical of attorney reaction to attempts to rebrand custody 
litigation.299  This may be a function of the System 2 thinking 
process discussed by Calder that requires “work” to change 
perceptions by considering the proposal, evaluating 
alternatives, and then favorably accepting the new value 
proposition.300  Adapting to changes in nomenclature and a 
process that had been in place for over a quarter of a century in 
Florida proved to be a slow transformation for attorneys and 
judges.301 
Aside from the behavioral science behind the difficulties 
individuals experience with change, is the educational 
underpinnings of most divorce lawyers.  Legal education is only 
now becoming more interdisciplinary and looking to social 
science and psychology as fields with which attorneys must have 
more than a casual acquaintance.302  As lawyers are expected to 
 
2012).   While primary and majority may not be true synonyms, neither term 
can be viewed as neutral because they both clearly imply that one parent has 
more time with the child than the other.  This fact will continue to cause 
litigation, especially because of the child support implications.  See supra notes 
193-194 and accompanying text. 
298. See supra notesnote 47-48 and accompanying text. 
299. See supra note 190, 205187 and accompanying text.. 
300. See Calder, supra note 58. 
301. See supra notes 183-86 and accompanying text. 
302. See generally Joan B. Kelly & Mary Kay Kisthardt, Helping Parents 
Tell Their Children about Separation and Divorce:  Social Science Frameworks 
and the Lawyer’s Counseling Responsibility, 22 J. AM. ACAD. MATRIM. LAW 315 
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assume more of a counseling role, they must assume the task of 
convincing clients of the efficacy of the new nomenclature and 
co-parenting expectations.  Unfortunately, they themselves may 
not be inclined to endorse the new paradigms as capable of 
delivering on the value proposition that custody disputes can be 
resolved with less acrimony.  Education of lawyers and judges 
then would be vital to success in the rebranding process. 
 
VII. Conclusion 
 
The promise of a less contentious divorce is a value 
proposition that most, if not all, would embrace.  With the 
current trend in custody litigation that has resulted in 
nomenclature changes and revisions in custody standards, 
efforts to achieve that brand promise could benefit from 
implementation of business branding principles.  In order to 
shift the focus away from “winning custody” to a paradigm that 
promotes co-parenting and eschew labels, all of the participants 
in custody disputes, including lawyers and judges, but most 
importantly parents, must view the changes as providing a 
favorable benefit. 
Rebranding concepts that focus on promoting an 
understanding of the new value proposition through social 
behavior marketing, allowing for an orderly transition to the 
new paradigm, using consistent branding across all statutes, 
and encouraging adoption by all stakeholders can be 
implemented to foster acceptance of the new value proposition.  
Simply adopting significant statutory revisions results in 
confusion by the courts, attorneys, and litigants, making it 
unlikely that the goals sought will be reached.  Successfully 
rebranding custody litigation as a system to establish parenting 
plans and apportion parenting time without acrimony or judicial 
intervention can become the “Healthy Choice” of divorcing 
parents. 
 
 
(2009); see also Catherine J. Ross, Choosing a Text for the Family Law 
Curriculum of the Twenty-First Century, 44 FAM. CT. REV. 584 (2006), for 
discussions on the need to reform legal education in the family law arena. 
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